Crisis of the West

Rethinking the West: Security, Economy, and Geopolitical Realignment
In a world marked by rising instability, the Western alliance is undergoing a profound transformation. From the erosion of Cold War-era nuclear deterrence to ideological shifts in economic policy, both Europe and the United States are navigating a complex new global order.
For decades, the U.S. ensured European and Asian security through an extended nuclear deterrent. Today, that strategy is faltering. Russia’s aggressive posturing, China’s military expansion, Iran’s ambitions, and disruptive technologies are all contributing to renewed nuclear insecurity. President Trump’s scepticism toward NATO has revived old fears about U.S. disengagement, forcing Europe to consider autonomous security strategies—developed in cooperation with researchers, policymakers, and civil society.
As Christoph Heusgen notes, the classical Cold War "West" is dissolving. The U.S. is stepping back from its leadership role, while Europe remains anchored to democratic principles and the rule of law. This realignment is paving the way for new alliances—such as an "Alliance of Multilateralism"—with like-minded nations like Canada and Australia.
U.S. conservative thought is also shifting. Oren Cass, founder of American Compass, argues for an economic policy centered on the working citizen — supporting tariffs, re-industrialization, vocational training, and labor unions. His ideas depart from GOP free-market orthodoxy and resemble European social democracy more than Reaganomics.
A fresh analysis of the Trump presidency, grounded in the Elite Quality Index (EQx2025), suggests that institutional change is increasingly driven by intra-elite competition among tech, finance, energy, and education sectors. These elite shifts raise a critical question: are we creating sustainable value, or merely extracting it?
The European Union is also rethinking its role. Facing war in Ukraine, technological dependency, and internal weaknesses, the EU's "Competitiveness Compass" aims to boost investment, reduce bureaucracy, and strengthen supply chains. Yet this strategy risks clashing with traditional EU values such as sustainability, human rights, and free trade.
Finally, Trump’s tariff-focused trade policy has drawn criticism. Economist Martin Wolf argues that tariffs may reduce the trade deficit but harm productivity and investment. A smarter strategy? Channel cheap capital into high-value, tradable sectors—benefiting both the U.S. and the global economy.
As the geopolitical and economic landscape continues to shift, the West must reinvent itself—strategically, institutionally, and ideologically.

Book

Towards an Elite Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Sustainable Value Creation (available in September 2025)

As we described our work on the publisher’s website: Institutions, the humanly devised constraints of economic activity, are outcomes of elite agency. Leveraging ideas from economics, sociology, politics, and strategic management, this book proposes an “elite theory of economic development”. The overarching goal is to foster sustainable value creation at the elite business model level. This work also aims to contribute to transformational leadership, and links are made to the annual Elite Quality Index (EQx), a measure of the value creation of national elites.

Book

Philip Manow: (De)Democratisation of Democracy (2020)

This book is the optimistic counterpart to Levitsky and Ziblatt, somewhat more demanding but also more original. Manow shows how democracy has become both more open and more vulnerable: more people are participating directly, while traditional institutions are losing their binding force. Many of today's crises arise from internal tensions between participation and representation. The book thus helps to understand the current transformation of democracy not only as decline, but also as the result of ambivalent changes.

Book

Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty

To better grasp the broader aims of elite theory, it is worth taking a look at the now-classic work by Noble Prize winners. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson link inclusive institutions to prosperity.

Book

Steven Levitsky / Daniel Ziblatt: How Democracies Die (2018)

You don't necessarily have to share the pessimism of this book to recognise its significance. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that today's democracies are hardly ever destroyed by coups, but rather by the creeping erosion of democratic norms. The book contrasts current developments in the USA with the Weimar Republic and authoritarian tendencies in Latin America, thereby sharpening our focus on the specific situation of democracy in the present day.

Book

The Future of European Competitiveness

Europe is another focus of elite theory which examines the performance of its elite system. There is no stronger diagnosis of the continents’ challenges than Mario Draghi’s report, "The Future of European Competitiveness" (2024) that benchmarks Europe against China and the United States.

Book

The Fragile Balance of Terror. Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age

"The Fragile Balance of Terror", edited by Vipin Narang and Scott D. Sagan, brings together a diverse collection of rigorous and creative scholars who analyze how the nuclear landscape is changing for the worse.

Book

Alexis de Tocqueville: De la démocratie en Amérique (1835/1840)

Anyone who wants to understand the history of democracy, the history of America and the history of the 19th century in a good way will find a wealth of inspiration in this book. Tocqueville was an aristocrat without reactionary airs and graces who analysed the French Revolution and American democracy with critical distance – and in doing so understood them in a good way compared to most of the actors involved. His book on democracy in America is one of the most important classics of modern democratic theory.

Podcast

The Economics Show

Unfortunately, not me but Martin Wolf, the Chief Economics Commentator at the Financial Times, talks to Kenneth Rogoff about Donald Trump's trade policy, the future of the dollar, and what this means for other currencies.

Book

Our Dollar, Your Problem

Harvard Professor Kenneth Rogoff demonstrates that the dollar’s decline began before Trump.

Book

Nuclear War: A Scenario

Up to now, no one outside of official circles has known exactly what would happen if a rogue state launched a nuclear missile at the Pentagon. Second by second and minute by minute, these are the real-life protocols that choreograph the end of civilisation as we know it. Based on dozens of new interviews with military and civilian experts, "Nuclear War" by Annie Jacobsen is at once a compulsive non-fiction thriller and a powerful argument that we must rid ourselves of these world-ending weapons for ever.

Book

If Then: How the Simulmatics Corporation Invented the Future.

This is a fascinating book that sheds light on early attempts to predict the future using data-driven forecasts and models – long before big data and social media dominated our lives. Jill Lepore takes us on a journey through the history of the Simulmatics Corporation, which in the 1960s attempted to control society through data analysis – first from 5th Avenue in New York for commercial marketing, then in the 1960 election campaign for John F. Kennedy, and at one point even in the Vietnam War. Their story impressively shows how technological developments and early forms of data analysis influenced the political landscape and continue to change our understanding of democracy and power to this day. But it also shows where the limits of the technologisation of democracy lie.

Podcast

Future of AI, Simulating Reality, Physics and Video Games

Demis Hassabis, CEO of Google DeepMind and Nobel Prize laureate, in conversation with Lex Fridman. One central focus of contemporary elite theory is artificial intelligence (AI), as emerging elites redefine the political economy. To understand the nature of the technology ahead, give it a listen.

Series

Yellowstone

"We're steeped in liberal culture" – many conservatives claim that we are saturated with left-wing liberal culture. They say that everything, from films and television to music, is ‘woke’ and ‘out of touch’. However, some productions are particularly successful in reaching conservative audiences. The neo-Western series "Yellowstone", starring Kevin Costner, tells stories about family ties, loyalty, resistance to the state, the conflict between the urban coastal mentality and that of the north-west, and the connection to the land itself.

Podcast

Interesting Times

There are more conservative podcasts than there is time to listen to them all. But Ross Douthat's “Interesting Times” is worth the 45 minutes a week. His guests are mostly conservatives, some very well-known such as Peter Thiel and Vice President JD Vance, others increasingly well- known such as Oren Cass, or (for many of us) yet to be discovered such as publisher Jonathan Keeperman.

Book

Why Liberalism Failed

In 2018, Deneen published what I still consider to be the sharpest conservative diagnosis of our times. In my view, it is essential reading. Oren Cass often sounds like an echo of Deneen.

Stay focused

From the feeds of universities, think tanks, and the media.
26.11.2025
25.11.2025
24.11.2025
Press release - MEPs push for “military Schengen” to withstand potential Russian aggression
Politics

Press release - MEPs push for “military Schengen” to withstand potential Russian aggression

Transport and Defence MEPs call urgently for easier movement of troops and military equipment across the EU by removing internal borders and upgrading infrastructure.Committee on Security and DefenceCommittee on Transport and Tourism Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Europäisches Parlament

The industrial age returns: Is Europe ready?
Business

The industrial age returns: Is Europe ready?

The industrial age returns: Is Europe ready? Expert comment LToremark 24 November 2025 Europe can achieve more than pessimists assume. But it requires alignment and political decisiveness. The 19th century German economist and political theorist Friedrich List once argued that ‘the power of a nation is based upon the development of its productive forces’.  As Europe finds itself grappling with an identity crisis amid the most consequential geopolitical shifts since the end of Second World War, it is coming to terms with the hard truth that in great power competition, industrial might drives all other forms of power. Europe is belatedly confronting how much of its influence rested on economic gravity it can no longer take for granted – nor sustain any longer.  For the past two decades, the EU mistook regulatory leadership for strategic insulation.  To assert its geopolitical relevance, defend its sovereignty and build a third way between the United States and China, Europe – more precisely the European Union (EU) – will need to radically transform its economy to become a credible competitor in the new industrial age. There will be no European power without a home-grown cutting-edge industry fit for a century driven by the twin transitions of digitization and carbon neutrality.These transitions are reshaping global power across the world. Platform economics, AI computing, critical minerals, resilient grids and low-carbon industrial ecosystems now set the norms of strategic weight. Meanwhile, Europe’s exposure to coercive dependencies — from gas pipelines to semiconductor supply chains — has revealed how fragile a post-industrial comfort zone can become in a world reverting to hard power. Related work Mario Draghi’s competitiveness report sets a political test for the EU For the past two decades, the EU mistook regulatory leadership for strategic insulation. But without productive depth in energy, technology, advanced manufacturing and scale finance, even the most sophisticated rulebook cannot anchor geopolitical relevance. Europe is now waking up to industrial reality and has begun to rethink its strategy. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently warned that Europe needs a new mindset, and move its focus from regulation to capability-building. But is it too late to catch up to those leading the charge?Europe’s strategic opportunitiesEurope can achieve more than pessimists assume — if leaders act with coherenceand speed.  Europe has the raw material for influence. What it lacks is alignment and, above all, political decisiveness. The recent launch of EuroStack is a step in the right direction. The initiative aims to build a secure, sovereign cloud and AI computing infrastructure for Europe, to reduce dependence on non-European platforms. The bloc also retains strengths in industrial automation, clean-tech engineering, automotive electrification, robotics and advanced materials. The European Chips Act, though modest compared to US and Asian programmes, can consolidate Europe’s niche strengths in power electronics and industrial semiconductors — critical for electric vehicles (EVs), renewables and next-generation manufacturing. In energy, offshore wind, green hydrogen, grid modernization and solar manufacturing can anchor a cheaper, cleaner and more secure ecosystem — if permitting accelerates and scale is pursued collectively.Three axes of political integration will be crucial to sustain the momentum and achieve substantial gains. First is capital formation, via an integrated capital markets union (CMU). Second is industrial deployment, through mission-driven innovation agencies (a European DARPA). Third is joint procurement and shared infrastructure, especially for hydrogen, semiconductors and AI computing.Europe has the raw material for influence. What it lacks is alignment and, above all, political decisiveness.Structural obstacles  Related work The rise of Reform, the AfD and RN is more than a blip – so what happens if the E3 goes far right? Some obvious and deeply rooted structural obstacles remain. And at a time when the continent’s shift to the hard right is accelerating, any attempt to lift them will be akin to walking through a minefield. Financial fragmentation means European savings do not translate into European investment in support of European tech scale-up. Without a functioning capital markets union, the continent cannot finance gigafactories, semiconductor fabs, hydrogen valleys or cloud-AI clusters. As the 2024 Draghi Report notes, Europe invests less not because it lacks capital, but because it cannot mobilize it — and when it can, it remains much less profitable than in the US.Regulatory divergence weakens scale. Telecoms, data, energy and transport remain balkanized — a continental handicap in sectors defined by network effects. And then German hesitation comes into play. Berlin’s instinctive caution — fiscal orthodoxy, coalition constraints, reluctance to embrace strategic debt — acts as a major brake on Europe’s structural reform trajectory, one that could recast the single market as a pivotal source of financing for the EU’s industrial transformation. Slow progress on grids, hydrogen corridors and industrial incentives reflects a deeper unwillingness to transition from an export-driven model to a resilience-driven one. But Germany’s reluctance is not just political, it is also structural. Its banking system is designed to protect regional lending rather than finance innovation at scale. It has long been identified as a major barrier to deeper capital-markets integration and high-growth investment in Europe, limiting cross-border financial intermediation and risk-sharing across the Eurozone.Overstated risks, overlooked strengths Related work Greece’s LNG energy hub ambitions will help EU needs now – but should not shape long-term policy It would be a mistake, however, to only focus on Europe’s structural slowness. Some of its perceived weaknesses are less structural than the prevailing narrative suggests. On AI: The EU’s absence of consumer platforms obscures its real strengths: industrial AI, robotics, embedded systems, autonomy and safety engineering — domains where value will accumulate as AI becomes infrastructure. Its industrial software ecosystem (SAP, Siemens, Dassault Systèmes) remains a global asset.On batteries: The tired cliché is that ‘Europe lost the battery race’ but gigafactories are scaling across the continent, in Sweden, France, Hungary and Spain. Europe is also emerging as a frontrunner in solid-state, sodium-ion and LFP technologies.

Chatham House

21.11.2025
20.11.2025
Low-cost Chinese AI models forge ahead, even in the US, raising the risks of a US AI bubble
Society

Low-cost Chinese AI models forge ahead, even in the US, raising the risks of a US AI bubble

Low-cost Chinese AI models forge ahead, even in the US, raising the risks of a US AI bubble Expert comment jon.wallace 20 November 2025 Nvidia’s latest earnings report reassured some. But Chinese AI models are fast gaining a following around the world, underlining concerns over an ‘AI bubble’ centered on high-investment, high-cost US models. This week Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia, took issue with talk of an ‘AI bubble’, as Nvidia announced bumper earnings growth in the latest quarter on strong sales of AI chips. ‘There has been a lot of talk about an AI bubble. From our vantage point we see something very different,’ he told analysts on Wednesday.Yet Huang’s previous remark on 6 November, that China will ‘win’ in AI , should be taken seriously in the West – in part for what it says about bubble fears. Huang is not the only prominent US figure to have commented recently on China’s remarkable progress in artificial intelligence.Brian Chesky, CEO of Airbnb and a friend of OpenAI founder Sam Altman, said that his company ‘relies heavily’ on Alibaba’s Qwen because the Chinese model is ‘very good’ and ‘also fast and cheap’. In contrast, he said of OpenAI’s ChatGPT: ‘I don’t think it was quite ready’ for Airbnb’s needs.Remarkably, Martin Casado, a partner at US venture capital firm 16z, says that most of the AI entrepreneurs he sees in the US are using AI models made in China. ‘I’d say 80 per cent chance [they are] using a Chinese open-source model,’ he was quoted as saying. Chamath Palihapitiya of Social Capital, a US investment firm, said he has chosen Kimi K2, an open-source AI model developed by the Chinese company Moonshot AI, to perform much of his company’s work. This is because Kimi K2 ‘was really way more performant and frankly just a ton cheaper than OpenAI and Anthropic’, he said.The AI race between the US and China is still in its early stages. It is too early to call a definitive winner. But the assessments of key industry figures that low-cost, high performance Chinese AI models are gaining ground in the US should add to concerns over an AI bubble’ – one centred around high-cost US models. China has huge cost advantages It is clear that Chinese AI companies enjoy key structural advantages over US counterparts. The main one is cost. This includes both the cost of developing new AI models and updates, as well as the cost of operating Large Language Models (LLM) for customers.In terms of development costs, China is quite simply in a different universe. By some estimates, Moonshot AI’s Kimi K2 cost just $4.6 million to train, a fraction of the billions that OpenAI is spending on research and development.  Related work The world should take the prospect of Chinese tech dominance seriously, and start preparing now Similarly, the costs of running the leading Chinese LLMs – DeepSeek, Qwen-Plus and Kimi K2 Thinking – come in at a sharp discount to operating both GPT 5 from OpenAI and Claude Sonnet 4.5 from Anthropic. For reference, the Claude Sonnet 4.5 costs $15 per million output tokens, while the Kimi K2 Thinking costs $2.5 .Another aspect of the leading Chinese LLMs’ appeal is that they are open-source. This allows users to deploy models on their own private infrastructure and ensure that sensitive data remains in-house. Several US LLMs are closed source, including ChatGPT. However, Llama from Meta, Phi from Microsoft and Gemma from Google are open-source. Indeed, even OpenAi launched the open-source GPT-oss in August.The US has access to much more powerful chipsThe US AI companies, however, enjoy an advantage in their unrestricted access to the latest AI chips, the Blackwell series made by Nvidia. The US has banned these chips from being sold to China, with US president Donald Trump saying this month that only US customers should have access. US export controls are far from watertight. Some banned chips are smuggled into China. Others are obtained by Chinese companies in third countries.  As things stand, the most advanced Nvidia chip that China can access under Washington’s export control regime is the H20, a high performing semiconductor which is nevertheless a full generation behind the latest Blackwell B200 and B100 chips. This gulf is thought to give users of the latest Blackwell chips up to 15 times more compute power over those using the H20.

Chatham House