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Auf der Website des Verlags haben wir unsere Arbeit so beschrieben: Institutionen sind von Menschen geschaffene Beschränkungen wirtschaftlicher Aktivitäten. Sie entstehen durch das Handeln einer Elite. Dieses Buch nimmt Ideen aus der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Soziologie, Politik und dem strategischen Management auf. Es stellt eine «Elitetheorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung» vor. Das übergeordnete Ziel ist die Förderung einer nachhaltigen Wertschöpfung auf der Ebene der Geschäftsmodelle der Elite. Diese Arbeit soll auch einen Beitrag zum transformativen Führungsstil leisten. Zudem stellt sie einen Bezug zum jährlichen Elite Quality Index (EQx) her, einem Massstab für die Wertschöpfung nationaler Eliten.
Buch
Dieses Buch ist das optimistische Gegenstück zu Levitsky und Ziblatt, etwas anspruchsvoller, aber auch origineller. Manow zeigt, wie die Demokratie zugleich offener und verletzlicher geworden ist: Mehr Menschen beteiligen sich direkt, während klassische Institutionen an Bindungskraft verlieren. Viele heutige Krisen entstehen aus inneren Spannungen zwischen Partizipation und Repräsentation. Damit hilft das Buch, den aktuellen Wandel der Demokratie nicht nur als Verfall, sondern auch als Folge ambivalenter Veränderungen zu verstehen.
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Um die grundlegenden Ziele der Elitetheorie besser zu verstehen, lohnt sich ein Blick auf das mittlerweile klassische Werk der Nobelpreisträger Daron Acemoglu und James Robinson. Die beiden Autoren bringen inklusive Institutionen mit Wohlstand in Verbindung.
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Man muss den Pessimismus dieses Buches nicht zwingend teilen, um seine Bedeutung anzuerkennen. Levitsky und Ziblatt argumentieren, dass heutige Demokratien kaum durch Putsche, sondern durch die schleichende Erosion demokratischer Normen zerfallen. Das Buch kontrastiert aktuelle Entwicklungen in den USA mit der Weimarer Republik und autoritären Tendenzen in Lateinamerika – und schärft damit den Blick für die spezifische Lage der Demokratie in der heutigen Zeit.
Podcast
Ein Namensvetter. Aber dieser Martin Wolf ist ‘Chief Economics Commentator’ bei der Financial Times. Er spricht mit Kenneth Rogoff über Donald Trumps Handelspolitik, die Zukunft des Dollars und was das für andere Währungen bedeutet.
Buch
Wer die Geschichte der Demokratie, die Geschichte Amerikas und die Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts besser verstehen möchte, findet in diesem Buch eine Fülle von Anregungen. Tocqueville war ein Aristokrat ohne reaktionäre Allüren, der die Französische Revolution und die Amerikanische Demokratie mit kritischer Distanz analysierte – und dabei besser verstand als die meisten involvierten Akteure. Sein Buch über die Demokratie in Amerika gehört zu den wichtigsten Klassikern der modernen Demokratietheorie.
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Europa ist ein weiterer Schwerpunkt der Elitetheorie. Hier wird die Leistungsfähigkeit des Elitesystems untersucht. Keine Diagnose beschreibt die Herausforderungen des Kontinents treffender als Mario Draghis Bericht «Die Zukunft der europäischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit» (2024). In diesem Bericht wird Europa mit China und den Vereinigten Staaten verglichen.
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In «The Fragile Balance of Terror», herausgegeben von Vipin Narang und Scott D. Sagan, analysieren renommierte Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, wie sich die nukleare Landschaft zum Schlechten verändert hat.
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Bis jetzt wusste niemand ausserhalb offizieller Kreise genau, was passiert, wenn ein Schurkenstaat eine Atomrakete auf das Pentagon abschiesst. Sekunde für Sekunde, Minute für Minute, choreografieren diese Protokolle das Ende der Zivilisation, wie wir sie kennen. «Nuclear War» von Annie Jacobsen basiert auf Dutzenden von Interviews mit militärischen und zivilen Fachleuten. Es ist ein fesselnder Sachbuch-Thriller und ein eindringliches Plädoyer, dass wir uns für immer von diesen weltvernichtenden Waffen befreien müssen.
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Harvard Professor Kenneth Rogoff zeigt, dass der Niedergang des Dollars schon vor Trump begonnen hat.
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Ein faszinierendes Buch, das den frühen Versuch beleuchtet, die Zukunft mit datengetriebenen Prognosen und Modellen vorherzusagen - lange bevor Big Data und soziale Medien unser Leben dominierten. Jill Lepore entführt uns in die Geschichte der Simulmatics Corporation, die in den 1960er Jahren versuchte, mit der Analyse von Daten die Gesellschaft zu steuern - erst von der 5th Avenue in New York aus fürs kommerzielle Marketing, dann im Wahlkampf 1960 für John F. Kennedy, und irgendwann sogar im Vietnamkrieg. Ihre Geschichte zeigt eindrucksvoll, wie technologische Entwicklungen und die Frühformen der Datenanalyse die politische Landschaft beeinflussten und bis heute unser Verständnis von Demokratie und Macht verändern. Sie zeigt aber auch, wo die Grenzen der Technisierung von Demokratie liegen.
Serie
«We’re steeped in liberal culture» – Wir seien durchtränkt von linksliberaler Kultur, behaupten viele Konservative: Filme, Fernsehen, Musik, alles sei «woke» und «out of touch». Es gibt allerdings Produktionen, die mit Erfolg vor allem auch das konservative Publikum erreichen: Die Neo-Western-Serie «Yellowstone» mit Kevin Costner bedient das Publikum mit Geschichten über Familienbande, Loyalität, Widerstand gegen Staat, den Konflikt zwischen urbaner Küstenmentalität und jene des Nordwestens sowie über die Verbundenheit mit dem Land an sich.
Podcast
Demis Hassabis, CEO von Google DeepMind und Nobelpreisträger, im Gespräch mit Lex Fridman. Ein zentraler Schwerpunkt der zeitgenössischen Elitetheorie ist die künstliche Intelligenz (KI). Aufstrebende Eliten definieren die politische Ökonomie neu. Um die Natur dieser zukunftsweisenden Technologie zu verstehen, hören Sie sich dieses Interview an.
Podcast
Es gibt mehr konservative Podcasts als Zeit, diese alle zu hören. Aber Ross Douthats «Interesting Times» lohnt die wöchentlichen 45 Minuten. Seine Gäste sind mehrheitlich Konservative, einige sehr bekannt wie Peter Thiel und Vizepräsident JD Vance, andere immer bekannter wie eben Oren Cass, oder (für viele von uns) noch zu entdecken wie Verleger Jonathan Keeperman.
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Deneen hat 2018 die für mich noch immer schärfste konservative Zeitdiagnose publiziert. Aus meiner Sicht: Pflichtlektüre. Auch Oren Cass liest sich oft wie ein Echo auf Deneen.
Hinter vielen Kriegen steckt wirtschaftliches Interesse, sagt die Journalistin Ulrike Herrmann. Da zeige sich an der Straße von Hormus, wo Öl und Gas zu Waffen werden. Diktatoren wie Putin führten Krieg, um von wirtschaftlichen Problemen abzulenken.Rohde, Stephanie
Deutschlandfunk
Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggered an unprecedented displacement of millions of refugees across Europe, highlighting the need to examine its political effects. This column discusses the effects of massive and unexpected inflows of Ukrainian labour migrants following Russia’s aggression in 2014 and of Ukrainian refugees following the full-scale invasion in 2022 on voting behaviour in Poland. The findings suggest that the impact of the first inflow on voting behaviour was primarily influenced by economic factors, but non-economic factors became more important when the salience of the Ukrainian migrants increased.
Center for Economic Policy Research
Legal, constitutional scholar suggests looking to judges’ practices for wider lessons
Harvard University
Trump has an incentive to strike a deal with Iran, as midterms approach. But at what cost? Expert comment jon.wallace 10 April 2026 Foreign policy is a low priority for US voters. But a rushed deal could impact the president’s domestic support in November’s midterm elections. After days of escalating rhetoric, the ceasefire announced on 7 April pulls the US and Iran back from grave danger and offers a window to assess the appetite for a more durable settlement. A deal offers the Trump administration a politically appealing off-ramp. Washington’s efforts to present its limited tactical battlefield gains as strategic successes to a sceptical American public hint at a desire to deescalate. Ending the war would certainly serve the president’s domestic agenda. November midterm elections are fast approaching, and renewed, prolonged fighting risks greater damage to the US economy – always the top American voter priority over foreign policy concerns.There is a danger now that Washington’s desire to reach agreement swiftly risks creating a bad deal for US national security – or at worst, as President Trump described the JPCOA in 2018, a ‘horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made’. Deal or no deal, the path ahead is fraught, with fewer options for the US than at the war’s outset and new security and economic risks to confront.Has the US achieved its war aims? Not really. By most measures, the US has not yet succeeded in prosecuting its shifting war aims. The Pentagon claimed destruction of 90 per cent of Iran’s naval fleet and 80 per cent of its air defences. That is an impressive feat across vast territory and against a deeply entrenched military command. US forces also pulled off a complex, daring rescue of two airmen shot down over Iranian territory. But these accomplishments have not neatly translated into tangible strategic gains. Though degraded, Iran still has the capability to launch ballistic missiles. Though weakened, Iran’s regional proxies can still operate with lethal effect. Its nuclear capabilities endure, in the form of 970 pounds of highly enriched uranium. And the war has likely only accelerated Tehran’s ambitions for a nuclear deterrent. Perhaps most significantly, the regime is still standing: wounded but emboldened, despite a successful campaign to remove most of its senior leadership. That leaves the US and the world confronted by a potentially more hard-line Iranian leadership exercising uniliteral control over the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, while the US-Israeli military campaign has undoubtedly set back some of Iran’s offensive capabilities, it has concurrently enabled a new one in the Strait and deepened the regime’s resolve. US deterrence through threat of force no longer packs the punch it did before the war. Will a lack of strategic success hurt Trump at home? Not among his base. A majority of Americans oppose Trump’s actions in Iran. Democrats condemn the operation almost categorically, independents strongly disapprove, and non-MAGA Republicans are divided. But MAGA supporters remain bullish, prioritizing loyalty to Trump’s agenda over concerns of US military overreach. And Republicans in Congress continue to give Trump wide latitude on the war. Criticism from the right has been limited to disaffected MAGA supporters, including former Member of Congress Marjorie Taylor Green, media commentator Tucker Carlson, and Senate moderates like Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski. In the short term, therefore, Trump’s domination of his party remains intact. The president may once again weather a political firestorm and gear up to quickly spark the next. Related work What lessons will China, India and other Asian nations draw from the Iran war? Independent Thinking Podcast The reckoning is more likely to come at the November midterms. As the world’s largest oil producer, the US is better insulated from the war’s economic shock than most. But it is not immune to the effects of the conflict. Rising gas prices and concerns about inflation are the two most visible economic consequences of the war today. And analysts believe further delayed financial costs are coming, particularly given the massive damage to oil and gas infrastructure across the Gulf. Even in a ‘deal’ scenario, elevated costs at the pump and in the grocery aisles could well be stickier than many Americans anticipate, handing Democrats ready attack lines in the months ahead on the issue that matters most to American voters: the economy. In a ‘no deal’ scenario, the president’s position will be more exposed, as Americans may find commercial goods, produce and holidays increasingly unaffordable, with ships idling in the Gulf, gas prices rising, and global crop yields hit by fertilizer scarcity. Financial markets may also be less resilient to additional geopolitical shocks, a metric the Trump administration watches closely. Such a scenario would present a real threat to Republican midterm hopes and potentially even begin to erode Trump’s extremely loyal MAGA base. That context will inform any push by the Trump administration toward a deal.Will the US and Iran strike a deal? Only if both see it as politically advantageous. In Washington, senior officials are now weighing whether the political and economic advantages to maintaining the shaky ceasefire – or at least seeking a series of halting extensions – supersede the value of renewed fighting. Current US and Iranian negotiation positions are maximalist, long-standing wish-lists that will not be resolved in the next two weeks. None can be achieved solely through an extended US bombing campaign or by the closing of the Strait of Hormuz. If US negotiators arrive in Pakistan without a hierarchy of priorities…the talks will collapse before they have begun. The detail of any negotiations with Iran matters here. It is clear what a bad deal looks like in Trump’s eyes, because he spelled out his criticisms when withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018: too few limits placed on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for lifting of sanctions; massive new revenue flowing to the regime; insufficient mechanisms to detect and punish cheating on enrichment levels; failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme; and silence on the Islamic Republic’s support for terrorism.If the US negotiators arrive in Pakistan without a hierarchy of priorities among this wish-list, the talks will collapse before they have begun. Realistically, a bad deal for the US includes terms that lift sanctions without ensuring meaningful and verifiable constraints on Iran’s nuclear programme, whether by securing the highly enriched uranium or limiting future enrichment. Addressing the nuclear programme will be more challenging than ever, when dealing with an even harder line regime. The US may have to put more concessions on the table to reach agreement – possibly beyond the sanctions and tariff relief Trump has already promised. The haste of the talks, and the absence of key international partners who would need to buy into any verification arrangement, make an even minimally credible deal hard to envision. The US and Iran could bring a draft arrangement to the UN Security Council for approval, as Trump did for Gaza. But few will want to invest the resources to enforce the arrangement if doubts remain about the parties’ willingness to adhere to its terms. Granting Iran the costly concessions it seeks – whether control over Hormuz, withdrawal of US forces from the region, an end to attacks on Iranian proxies, or the release of frozen Iranian assets – risk imperilling US national security in the longer term. More immediately, any significant concession would hand Democrats a ready hand to play in November.
Chatham House
How to keep the Strait of Hormuz open in the long term Expert comment jon.wallace 10 April 2026 Iran will be reluctant to give up the leverage it has gained in the Strait. But options exist to try and change its perspective. On 7 April the United States and Iran announced a ceasefire, including the re-opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait has been closed since 2 March following the outbreak of the conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran. Since the late 1980s, the Strait has enjoyed uninterrupted traffic, with no countries charging fees for transit. There have been risks to shipping in that period, from the 1990 Gulf War to threats from Iran in the mid-2010s. But shipping continued through the Strait, albeit with higher insurance costs.But over the past month, Iran has laid sea mines, bombed ships, and charged fees for transit in order to assert its control over this vital waterway. As part of its 10-point ceasefire plan, Tehran has demanded that its control over Hormuz should continue. According to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, passage through the Strait will be allowed during the two-week ceasefire, under management by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). After that, Iran and Oman will charge fees on ship transit. Over the past month, various efforts have been made to secure shipping through the Strait. From 18-19 March, the International Maritime Organization called for a ‘safe passage framework’ to facilitate the evacuation of merchant ships and crew trapped in the Gulf by the Strait closure. On 2 April, the UK held talks with over 40 countries to discuss options to press Iran to re-open the Strait. A few days later, the United Nations Security Council voted on a resolution from Bahrain and Gulf Cooperation Council countries about using protective measures to re-open the Strait. The resolution ultimately failed. Meanwhile, very few ships have transited the Strait since the ceasefire was announced. As such, the ceasefire has only created more uncertainty about transit through the Strait, further deterring commercial shipping. The question remains: how can the Strait be re-opened safely – and kept open for the future? It is a complex challenge, interconnected with negotiation with the US. But options exist that could help influence Tehran’s thinking.Iran’s roleEffective control of the Strait of Hormuz gives Iran an asymmetric advantage that helps shield it from what it views as an existential threat from US and Israeli strikes – and generates significant funds for a country still under sanctions and badly damaged by the war. Iran will not easily give up this leverage. However, this is not a sustainable long-term strategy for the world – or for Tehran. Iran’s economy is structurally dependent on oil exports, and it imports industrial goods and food through the Strait. Closing the Strait constrains its own revenue stream and undercuts its maritime logistics industry. Diplomats will need to consider how to shift Tehran’s perception so that the normal operation of the Strait becomes a preferable option. As such, Iran must be a party to any agreement over the Strait. Mediators should therefore consider options that are palatable to the regime. This does not mean accepting Iran’s terms about maintaining permanent control over the Strait. But it does require making Iran a beneficiary in the process of re-opening. Realistically this may require structured sanctions relief and joint management of the Strait. Related work The Strait of Hormuz, shipping, and law Already the Trump administration has demonstrated a willingness to compromise: On 20 March, the US Treasury lifted sanctions on Iranian oil already at sea. And, when asked about Iran’s plans to charge fees for ship transit, Trump said he is considering a ‘joint venture’ with Tehran to set up tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. Likewise, any naval convoys designed to escort ships through the region would have to include Iran. The Strait cannot be opened by force. Escorts could pair limited Iranian exports with other commercial ships. Joint transits would deter Iranian attack, because they would include Iranian goods as well. Whether through sanctions relief or not, Iranian exports are still transiting through Hormuz to the exclusion of nearly everyone else. At present, Iran’s toll-like system requires ships to enter Iranian waters to pass an IRCG verification process. As a confidence-building measure, verification for transit could be put in place – not from Iran, but perhaps with Iran.This could come in the form of multilateral management or in partnership with countries that can provide complementary escorts and security guarantees. It seems that Oman may be considering such a partnership with Iran over the Strait. This could be expanded to include more regional security partners. Region-specific protocolsThe Gulf lacks comprehensive maritime security frameworks and protocols. Iran, for example, is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). And the UAE, Bahrain, Iran, and others are not signatories on the 1979 Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue. Furthermore, the Gulf still faces maritime boundary disputes that preclude the establishment of such legal frameworks. As a result, international law is unevenly applied and enforced. So long as that remains the case, it will be harder to rebuild confidence in Gulf shipping.Region-specific provisions are needed for basic maritime coordination between littoral states. This could include the establishment of search and rescue zones, traffic management schemes, regional information fusion centres, and law enforcement cooperation to counter piracy and illegal fishing. In the Gulf, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) for East Africa offers a useful model to consider. The DCoC was adopted in 2009 by 20 countries including Djibouti, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen to strengthen cooperation against piracy. The Code establishes a framework for information sharing, law enforcement, and maritime security operations focused on the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. In 2017, the Code was revised to include broader maritime security issues like narcotics trafficking and illegal fishing. Such longer-term agreements offer mechanisms to coordinate ship interdictions, facilitate information exchange, develop common threat perceptions, and harmonize legal processes. In an era of grey zone warfare, this may be best path forward.Multi-national coordinationPrevious chokepoint agreements like the Black Sea Grain Deal or the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits have been suggested as models for how to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. But these example agreements won’t work in the Gulf. There is no country like Turkey that has the geography, politics, or capabilities to unilaterally guarantee movement through the Strait. Less recognized practices like the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand offer more realistic models for Hormuz. Less recognized practices like the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand offer more realistic models for Hormuz. MSP was launched in 2004 to enhance security in the Malacca Strait and bolster existing bilateral arrangements. Participating navies conducted coordinated sea patrols and practiced information sharing between ships and naval operation centres. As a result of its success, Lloyd’s Joint War Risk Committee dropped the classification of the Malacca Strait as a ‘war risk area’ in 2006. Under the International Maritime Organization, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia also established the Malacca Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) and STRAITREP system to enhance safety of navigation in the Malacca Strait and the region. The TSS and MSP are both viable models for future traffic monitoring and verification process in the Gulf region.
Chatham House
