The “self-steering” DisCIPL system directs small models to work together on tasks with constraints, like itinerary planning and budgeting.
MIT

Global security continued to unravel in 2025. Crucial tests are coming in 2026 Expert comment jon.wallace 12 December 2025 Alarming events in nuclear proliferation, space security and hybrid warfare meant 2025 was a year in which the international security order deteriorated. 2025 has not been a banner year for the international security order. A ceasefire in Gaza’s brutal war was achieved – though Israel and Hamas each accuse the other of violating the truce. Elsewhere, from Ukraine to Sudan, ongoing conflicts seem only more intractable. And the threat of further violence looms from Venezuela to the India–Pakistan border. In response to this growing instability, governments are spending on defence at levels not seen since the Cold War. Meanwhile international aid spending has been slashed by many Western countries – worsening conditions in conflict affected countries and degrading early warning systems. 2025 accelerated numerous developments in insecurity but four particular trends stand out.Nuclear showdowns and nuclear powerNuclear arms control continued to unravel over 2025. Expanding nuclear and conventional missile tests by major powers created serious escalation concerns. Meanwhile, China’s arsenal continued to expand, on a trajectory that could see it have at least as many ICBMs as either Russia or the USA by the end of the decade. At the same time, a series of extraordinary events undermined a fragile strategic balance.February’s Munich Security Conference speech by US Vice President JD Vance indicated the new Trump administration’s declining commitment to European defence and raised questions about the credibility of NATO’s article 5 mutual defence guarantee – a critical question in light of previous Russian nuclear threats relating to Ukraine. A 4-day crisis in May between India and Pakistan saw two nuclear-armed states in open conflict, alarming observers for its potential to escalate. Tensions remained high, particularly following terror attacks in Islamabad and New Delhi. In June, US–Israel strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities were followed by the suspension of some IAEA inspections in the country, rendering the status of Iran’s nuclear programme unclear, and deepening security concerns in the Middle East. That may have contributed to Saudi Arabia’s decision to sign a mutual defence agreement with nuclear-armed Pakistan in September. Related work Russia and the US put nuclear testing back on the table. Is time running out for arms control? In October, Russia claimed to have tested a nuclear-powered cruise missile. The same month, the US and Russia broached the possibility of renewing nuclear weapons testing, threatening to collapse a 30-year moratorium that has underpinned strategic stability. Later that month President Trump endorsed South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines, which caused North Korea to warn of a ‘nuclear domino’ effect, raising fears of regional nuclear proliferation. 2026 will quickly provide a critical inflection point for nuclear arms control: New START, the last arms-control agreement between the US and Russia (owners of the largest nuclear weapon stockpiles) will expire in February 2026.Failure to agree even a symbolic extension could drive an uncontrolled expansion of US and Russian nuclear arsenals – fuelling proliferation elsewhere. Hybrid warfare intensifiesHybrid attacks in Europe have increased significantly since the Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. 2023 and 2024 saw an increase in damage to undersea infrastructure in the Baltic and North Seas. But 2025 has been characterized by an increase in drone disruption: at airports, and at other important strategic locations like military bases. Drones, crewed aircraft, and even balloons have repeatedly violated European states’ sovereign airspace along the border with Russia and Belarus, creating serious disruption. Most states do not have sufficient defensive anti-drone systems in place. The air defence systems that exist are built to counter missile or aircraft threats and are therefore not cost-effective in countering drones. This means that adversaries have been able to cause significant disruption to air travel almost unhindered.The increase in drone incidents, air space violations and physical sabotage is likely to have a big impact on European actions in 2026. European publics find them disconcerting and favour more action to protect them. There is a chance that a country might shoot down a Russian aircraft in 2026. However, European governments have been struggling to define a comprehensive strategy to respond to such attacks, given their disparate nature and the difficulty of attributing them. There is a chance that a country might shoot down a Russian aircraft in 2026 – Poland’s foreign minister warned his country may do so during a meeting at the UN in September. Such an act could be the forceful gesture Russia needs to persuade it to cease attacks – or it could risk an unprecedented escalation. Weaponized interdependenceThough certainly not new, 2025 was the year countries increasingly showcased their willingness to exploit economic linkages and supply-chain vulnerabilities as instruments of coercion and geopolitical leverage. China weaponized its hold over global rare earth supplies and processing capabilities by restricting exports – critical to almost all high-end manufacturing, including many weapon systems. Related work China’s new restrictions on rare earth exports send a stark warning to the West In September, Beijing imposed a temporary export ban on drone components, vital for Ukraine’s war effort. In October, another ban, on low-end Nexperia chip exports, threatened to ground the European car industry to a halt. The US also looked to use its economic might, exploiting allies’ overwhelming reliance on the US security umbrella, technology and market access as leverage to extract favourable trade and tariff concessions. Countries that have long relied on openness and interconnectedness in global supply chains find themselves increasingly vulnerable in this new era of geoeconomics. Many are now investing in developing their own sovereign capabilities and reducing their reliance on others – efforts which are set to become their own source of friction and tension in 2026.Space security and the return of ‘Star Wars’The US decision to stop sharing intelligence and satellite imagery with Ukraine in March 2025 provided a harsh wakeup call for many European NATO members – who also rely on the US for many space capabilities. Germany has just published its first space security strategy, drawing on lessons from Russian attacks on Ukrainian space communication systems. The Finnish armed forces significantly invested in their satellites over 2025. And space security was a significant focus in the UK’s Security and Defence Review. In November, President Macron announced €4.2 billion of funding for weapons to support European interests in space.
Chatham House

Als OpenAI 2015 gegründet wurde, konnte niemand dessen rasante Entwicklung vorhersehen. Aus einer gemeinnützigen Organisation zur Erforschung Künstlicher Intelligenz wurde dank des Chatbots ChatGPT die wertvollste nicht-börsennotierte Firma der Welt.
Deutschlandfunk

Almost 70% of people globally are comfortable with their government buying Chinese-made clean technologies, new survey finds News release jon.wallace 8 December 2025 New data suggests that China’s clean tech ‘charm offensive’ is working to win over emerging economies. COP30 saw China flexing its climate diplomacy muscles in place of an absent US – underpinned by Beijing’s dominance of global clean energy supply chains in stark contrast to President Trump’s outspoken ‘war’ on clean energy. However, results from a recent survey commissioned by Chatham House and conducted by GlobeScan reveals that there is not only a high level of consumer interest in clean technology around the globe, but also wide support for Chinese-made clean technology like solar panels and electric vehicles (EVs), which are dominating the market.‘It’s not just theory anymore – solar and EVs are now winning hearts and minds, and most importantly, wallets,’ notes Bernice Lee, Distinguished Fellow at Chatham House’s Environment and Society Centre. Nearly 7 in 10 support their governments purchasing Chinese-made solar panels and wind turbines to some degree. ‘Despite President Trump’s high-profile war on clean technology, even in the US large majorities either already own or are interested in buying clean-tech products,’ notes Lee.Responses collected in summer 2025 across 33 markets revealed that around half of consumers surveyed are at least somewhat likely to consider buying Chinese-made solar panels or EVs – whereas nearly 7 in 10 support their governments purchasing Chinese-made solar panels and wind turbines to some degree. Despite some governments being vocal over security concerns of tech dependence and China’s growing influence, consumers seem more relaxed – especially younger people. ‘As China becomes more closely associated with supplying affordable versions of these increasingly popular products, China’s soft power continues to grow,’ says Lee. Results demonstrate that the degree of support correlates with Global North/Global South country status. Respondents from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Latin America are the most likely to purchase, or support their governments purchasing, Chinese clean technology – whereas richer countries like those in Europe and North America are the least likely. Younger consumers like millennials and Gen Z are more likely to consider buying Chinese-made clean technologies. ‘Traditional Western perceptions of Chinese-manufactured products as poor quality are not shared in the Global South, where interest in buying Chinese-clean technology products is very high,’ says Chris Aylett, Research Fellow at Chatham House.Survey results also demonstrate a clear generational divide – younger consumers like millennials and Gen Z are more likely to consider buying Chinese-made clean technologies while Baby Boomers are the least likely. In 8 countries surveyed in both 2024 and 2025, the level of support for personal or government consumption of Chinese-made solar panels or EVs remained consistent or increased over the past year – with the largest increases recorded in the USA, South Africa and Turkey. Chris Aylett said: ‘The growth in positive perceptions of Chinese-made clean technology over the past year is remarkable.’‘While part of this may simply be due to the surge in availability, another explanation could possibly be the generally improved view of China as a source of certainty and stability, contrasted with the volatility of the US.’Survey details:Online surveying in 33 markets in July and August 2025, and 8 markets in July and August 2024 for comparison. Countries include: Asia-Pacific: Australia, China, Hong Kong, India*, Indonesia*, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam. Europe: France, Germany*, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, UK. Latin America: Argentina, Brazil*, Colombia, Mexico*, Peru. Middle East and North Africa: Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey*. North America: Canada, USA*. Sub-Saharan Africa: Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa* (* indicates survey conducted in both 2024 and 2025)Representative online samples of approximately 1,000 adults in each of 33 markets (500 each in Hong Kong, Kenya, Nigeria, and Singapore, and 1,500 in USA)(n=31,960)Samples are representative of online population, weighted to reflect general population census data Read the survey in full: Global Perceptions of Clean Technologies (PDF, 1.62MB)
Chatham House

Nach Sichtung von Drohnen über kritischer Infrastruktur wächst in Europa die Nervosität. Ihre Abwehr bekommt oberste Priorität. Die Industrie profitiert von Investitionen in Milliardenhöhe – und von den Erfahrungen ukrainischer Kämpfer an der Front.Schimmeck, Tom
Deutschlandfunk
