Book
As we described our work on the publisher’s website: Institutions, the humanly devised constraints of economic activity, are outcomes of elite agency. Leveraging ideas from economics, sociology, politics, and strategic management, this book proposes an “elite theory of economic development”. The overarching goal is to foster sustainable value creation at the elite business model level. This work also aims to contribute to transformational leadership, and links are made to the annual Elite Quality Index (EQx), a measure of the value creation of national elites.
Book
This book is the optimistic counterpart to Levitsky and Ziblatt, somewhat more demanding but also more original. Manow shows how democracy has become both more open and more vulnerable: more people are participating directly, while traditional institutions are losing their binding force. Many of today's crises arise from internal tensions between participation and representation. The book thus helps to understand the current transformation of democracy not only as decline, but also as the result of ambivalent changes.
Book
To better grasp the broader aims of elite theory, it is worth taking a look at the now-classic work by Noble Prize winners. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson link inclusive institutions to prosperity.
Book
You don't necessarily have to share the pessimism of this book to recognise its significance. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that today's democracies are hardly ever destroyed by coups, but rather by the creeping erosion of democratic norms. The book contrasts current developments in the USA with the Weimar Republic and authoritarian tendencies in Latin America, thereby sharpening our focus on the specific situation of democracy in the present day.
Podcast
Unfortunately, not me but Martin Wolf, the Chief Economics Commentator at the Financial Times, talks to Kenneth Rogoff about Donald Trump's trade policy, the future of the dollar, and what this means for other currencies.
Book
Anyone who wants to understand the history of democracy, the history of America and the history of the 19th century in a good way will find a wealth of inspiration in this book. Tocqueville was an aristocrat without reactionary airs and graces who analysed the French Revolution and American democracy with critical distance – and in doing so understood them in a good way compared to most of the actors involved. His book on democracy in America is one of the most important classics of modern democratic theory.
Book
Europe is another focus of elite theory which examines the performance of its elite system. There is no stronger diagnosis of the continents’ challenges than Mario Draghi’s report, "The Future of European Competitiveness" (2024) that benchmarks Europe against China and the United States.
Book
"The Fragile Balance of Terror", edited by Vipin Narang and Scott D. Sagan, brings together a diverse collection of rigorous and creative scholars who analyze how the nuclear landscape is changing for the worse.
Book
Up to now, no one outside of official circles has known exactly what would happen if a rogue state launched a nuclear missile at the Pentagon. Second by second and minute by minute, these are the real-life protocols that choreograph the end of civilisation as we know it. Based on dozens of new interviews with military and civilian experts, "Nuclear War" by Annie Jacobsen is at once a compulsive non-fiction thriller and a powerful argument that we must rid ourselves of these world-ending weapons for ever.
Book
Harvard Professor Kenneth Rogoff demonstrates that the dollar’s decline began before Trump.
Book
This is a fascinating book that sheds light on early attempts to predict the future using data-driven forecasts and models – long before big data and social media dominated our lives. Jill Lepore takes us on a journey through the history of the Simulmatics Corporation, which in the 1960s attempted to control society through data analysis – first from 5th Avenue in New York for commercial marketing, then in the 1960 election campaign for John F. Kennedy, and at one point even in the Vietnam War. Their story impressively shows how technological developments and early forms of data analysis influenced the political landscape and continue to change our understanding of democracy and power to this day. But it also shows where the limits of the technologisation of democracy lie.
Series
"We're steeped in liberal culture" – many conservatives claim that we are saturated with left-wing liberal culture. They say that everything, from films and television to music, is ‘woke’ and ‘out of touch’. However, some productions are particularly successful in reaching conservative audiences. The neo-Western series "Yellowstone", starring Kevin Costner, tells stories about family ties, loyalty, resistance to the state, the conflict between the urban coastal mentality and that of the north-west, and the connection to the land itself.
Podcast
Demis Hassabis, CEO of Google DeepMind and Nobel Prize laureate, in conversation with Lex Fridman. One central focus of contemporary elite theory is artificial intelligence (AI), as emerging elites redefine the political economy. To understand the nature of the technology ahead, give it a listen.
Podcast
There are more conservative podcasts than there is time to listen to them all. But Ross Douthat's “Interesting Times” is worth the 45 minutes a week. His guests are mostly conservatives, some very well-known such as Peter Thiel and Vice President JD Vance, others increasingly well- known such as Oren Cass, or (for many of us) yet to be discovered such as publisher Jonathan Keeperman.
Book
In 2018, Deneen published what I still consider to be the sharpest conservative diagnosis of our times. In my view, it is essential reading. Oren Cass often sounds like an echo of Deneen.
Hinter vielen Kriegen steckt wirtschaftliches Interesse, sagt die Journalistin Ulrike Herrmann. Da zeige sich an der Straße von Hormus, wo Öl und Gas zu Waffen werden. Diktatoren wie Putin führten Krieg, um von wirtschaftlichen Problemen abzulenken.Rohde, Stephanie
Deutschlandfunk
Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggered an unprecedented displacement of millions of refugees across Europe, highlighting the need to examine its political effects. This column discusses the effects of massive and unexpected inflows of Ukrainian labour migrants following Russia’s aggression in 2014 and of Ukrainian refugees following the full-scale invasion in 2022 on voting behaviour in Poland. The findings suggest that the impact of the first inflow on voting behaviour was primarily influenced by economic factors, but non-economic factors became more important when the salience of the Ukrainian migrants increased.
Center for Economic Policy Research
Legal, constitutional scholar suggests looking to judges’ practices for wider lessons
Harvard University
Trump has an incentive to strike a deal with Iran, as midterms approach. But at what cost? Expert comment jon.wallace 10 April 2026 Foreign policy is a low priority for US voters. But a rushed deal could impact the president’s domestic support in November’s midterm elections. After days of escalating rhetoric, the ceasefire announced on 7 April pulls the US and Iran back from grave danger and offers a window to assess the appetite for a more durable settlement. A deal offers the Trump administration a politically appealing off-ramp. Washington’s efforts to present its limited tactical battlefield gains as strategic successes to a sceptical American public hint at a desire to deescalate. Ending the war would certainly serve the president’s domestic agenda. November midterm elections are fast approaching, and renewed, prolonged fighting risks greater damage to the US economy – always the top American voter priority over foreign policy concerns.There is a danger now that Washington’s desire to reach agreement swiftly risks creating a bad deal for US national security – or at worst, as President Trump described the JPCOA in 2018, a ‘horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made’. Deal or no deal, the path ahead is fraught, with fewer options for the US than at the war’s outset and new security and economic risks to confront.Has the US achieved its war aims? Not really. By most measures, the US has not yet succeeded in prosecuting its shifting war aims. The Pentagon claimed destruction of 90 per cent of Iran’s naval fleet and 80 per cent of its air defences. That is an impressive feat across vast territory and against a deeply entrenched military command. US forces also pulled off a complex, daring rescue of two airmen shot down over Iranian territory. But these accomplishments have not neatly translated into tangible strategic gains. Though degraded, Iran still has the capability to launch ballistic missiles. Though weakened, Iran’s regional proxies can still operate with lethal effect. Its nuclear capabilities endure, in the form of 970 pounds of highly enriched uranium. And the war has likely only accelerated Tehran’s ambitions for a nuclear deterrent. Perhaps most significantly, the regime is still standing: wounded but emboldened, despite a successful campaign to remove most of its senior leadership. That leaves the US and the world confronted by a potentially more hard-line Iranian leadership exercising uniliteral control over the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, while the US-Israeli military campaign has undoubtedly set back some of Iran’s offensive capabilities, it has concurrently enabled a new one in the Strait and deepened the regime’s resolve. US deterrence through threat of force no longer packs the punch it did before the war. Will a lack of strategic success hurt Trump at home? Not among his base. A majority of Americans oppose Trump’s actions in Iran. Democrats condemn the operation almost categorically, independents strongly disapprove, and non-MAGA Republicans are divided. But MAGA supporters remain bullish, prioritizing loyalty to Trump’s agenda over concerns of US military overreach. And Republicans in Congress continue to give Trump wide latitude on the war. Criticism from the right has been limited to disaffected MAGA supporters, including former Member of Congress Marjorie Taylor Green, media commentator Tucker Carlson, and Senate moderates like Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski. In the short term, therefore, Trump’s domination of his party remains intact. The president may once again weather a political firestorm and gear up to quickly spark the next. Related work What lessons will China, India and other Asian nations draw from the Iran war? Independent Thinking Podcast The reckoning is more likely to come at the November midterms. As the world’s largest oil producer, the US is better insulated from the war’s economic shock than most. But it is not immune to the effects of the conflict. Rising gas prices and concerns about inflation are the two most visible economic consequences of the war today. And analysts believe further delayed financial costs are coming, particularly given the massive damage to oil and gas infrastructure across the Gulf. Even in a ‘deal’ scenario, elevated costs at the pump and in the grocery aisles could well be stickier than many Americans anticipate, handing Democrats ready attack lines in the months ahead on the issue that matters most to American voters: the economy. In a ‘no deal’ scenario, the president’s position will be more exposed, as Americans may find commercial goods, produce and holidays increasingly unaffordable, with ships idling in the Gulf, gas prices rising, and global crop yields hit by fertilizer scarcity. Financial markets may also be less resilient to additional geopolitical shocks, a metric the Trump administration watches closely. Such a scenario would present a real threat to Republican midterm hopes and potentially even begin to erode Trump’s extremely loyal MAGA base. That context will inform any push by the Trump administration toward a deal.Will the US and Iran strike a deal? Only if both see it as politically advantageous. In Washington, senior officials are now weighing whether the political and economic advantages to maintaining the shaky ceasefire – or at least seeking a series of halting extensions – supersede the value of renewed fighting. Current US and Iranian negotiation positions are maximalist, long-standing wish-lists that will not be resolved in the next two weeks. None can be achieved solely through an extended US bombing campaign or by the closing of the Strait of Hormuz. If US negotiators arrive in Pakistan without a hierarchy of priorities…the talks will collapse before they have begun. The detail of any negotiations with Iran matters here. It is clear what a bad deal looks like in Trump’s eyes, because he spelled out his criticisms when withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018: too few limits placed on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for lifting of sanctions; massive new revenue flowing to the regime; insufficient mechanisms to detect and punish cheating on enrichment levels; failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme; and silence on the Islamic Republic’s support for terrorism.If the US negotiators arrive in Pakistan without a hierarchy of priorities among this wish-list, the talks will collapse before they have begun. Realistically, a bad deal for the US includes terms that lift sanctions without ensuring meaningful and verifiable constraints on Iran’s nuclear programme, whether by securing the highly enriched uranium or limiting future enrichment. Addressing the nuclear programme will be more challenging than ever, when dealing with an even harder line regime. The US may have to put more concessions on the table to reach agreement – possibly beyond the sanctions and tariff relief Trump has already promised. The haste of the talks, and the absence of key international partners who would need to buy into any verification arrangement, make an even minimally credible deal hard to envision. The US and Iran could bring a draft arrangement to the UN Security Council for approval, as Trump did for Gaza. But few will want to invest the resources to enforce the arrangement if doubts remain about the parties’ willingness to adhere to its terms. Granting Iran the costly concessions it seeks – whether control over Hormuz, withdrawal of US forces from the region, an end to attacks on Iranian proxies, or the release of frozen Iranian assets – risk imperilling US national security in the longer term. More immediately, any significant concession would hand Democrats a ready hand to play in November.
Chatham House
How to keep the Strait of Hormuz open in the long term Expert comment jon.wallace 10 April 2026 Iran will be reluctant to give up the leverage it has gained in the Strait. But options exist to try and change its perspective. On 7 April the United States and Iran announced a ceasefire, including the re-opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait has been closed since 2 March following the outbreak of the conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran. Since the late 1980s, the Strait has enjoyed uninterrupted traffic, with no countries charging fees for transit. There have been risks to shipping in that period, from the 1990 Gulf War to threats from Iran in the mid-2010s. But shipping continued through the Strait, albeit with higher insurance costs.But over the past month, Iran has laid sea mines, bombed ships, and charged fees for transit in order to assert its control over this vital waterway. As part of its 10-point ceasefire plan, Tehran has demanded that its control over Hormuz should continue. According to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, passage through the Strait will be allowed during the two-week ceasefire, under management by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). After that, Iran and Oman will charge fees on ship transit. Over the past month, various efforts have been made to secure shipping through the Strait. From 18-19 March, the International Maritime Organization called for a ‘safe passage framework’ to facilitate the evacuation of merchant ships and crew trapped in the Gulf by the Strait closure. On 2 April, the UK held talks with over 40 countries to discuss options to press Iran to re-open the Strait. A few days later, the United Nations Security Council voted on a resolution from Bahrain and Gulf Cooperation Council countries about using protective measures to re-open the Strait. The resolution ultimately failed. Meanwhile, very few ships have transited the Strait since the ceasefire was announced. As such, the ceasefire has only created more uncertainty about transit through the Strait, further deterring commercial shipping. The question remains: how can the Strait be re-opened safely – and kept open for the future? It is a complex challenge, interconnected with negotiation with the US. But options exist that could help influence Tehran’s thinking.Iran’s roleEffective control of the Strait of Hormuz gives Iran an asymmetric advantage that helps shield it from what it views as an existential threat from US and Israeli strikes – and generates significant funds for a country still under sanctions and badly damaged by the war. Iran will not easily give up this leverage. However, this is not a sustainable long-term strategy for the world – or for Tehran. Iran’s economy is structurally dependent on oil exports, and it imports industrial goods and food through the Strait. Closing the Strait constrains its own revenue stream and undercuts its maritime logistics industry. Diplomats will need to consider how to shift Tehran’s perception so that the normal operation of the Strait becomes a preferable option. As such, Iran must be a party to any agreement over the Strait. Mediators should therefore consider options that are palatable to the regime. This does not mean accepting Iran’s terms about maintaining permanent control over the Strait. But it does require making Iran a beneficiary in the process of re-opening. Realistically this may require structured sanctions relief and joint management of the Strait. Related work The Strait of Hormuz, shipping, and law Already the Trump administration has demonstrated a willingness to compromise: On 20 March, the US Treasury lifted sanctions on Iranian oil already at sea. And, when asked about Iran’s plans to charge fees for ship transit, Trump said he is considering a ‘joint venture’ with Tehran to set up tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. Likewise, any naval convoys designed to escort ships through the region would have to include Iran. The Strait cannot be opened by force. Escorts could pair limited Iranian exports with other commercial ships. Joint transits would deter Iranian attack, because they would include Iranian goods as well. Whether through sanctions relief or not, Iranian exports are still transiting through Hormuz to the exclusion of nearly everyone else. At present, Iran’s toll-like system requires ships to enter Iranian waters to pass an IRCG verification process. As a confidence-building measure, verification for transit could be put in place – not from Iran, but perhaps with Iran.This could come in the form of multilateral management or in partnership with countries that can provide complementary escorts and security guarantees. It seems that Oman may be considering such a partnership with Iran over the Strait. This could be expanded to include more regional security partners. Region-specific protocolsThe Gulf lacks comprehensive maritime security frameworks and protocols. Iran, for example, is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). And the UAE, Bahrain, Iran, and others are not signatories on the 1979 Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue. Furthermore, the Gulf still faces maritime boundary disputes that preclude the establishment of such legal frameworks. As a result, international law is unevenly applied and enforced. So long as that remains the case, it will be harder to rebuild confidence in Gulf shipping.Region-specific provisions are needed for basic maritime coordination between littoral states. This could include the establishment of search and rescue zones, traffic management schemes, regional information fusion centres, and law enforcement cooperation to counter piracy and illegal fishing. In the Gulf, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) for East Africa offers a useful model to consider. The DCoC was adopted in 2009 by 20 countries including Djibouti, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen to strengthen cooperation against piracy. The Code establishes a framework for information sharing, law enforcement, and maritime security operations focused on the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. In 2017, the Code was revised to include broader maritime security issues like narcotics trafficking and illegal fishing. Such longer-term agreements offer mechanisms to coordinate ship interdictions, facilitate information exchange, develop common threat perceptions, and harmonize legal processes. In an era of grey zone warfare, this may be best path forward.Multi-national coordinationPrevious chokepoint agreements like the Black Sea Grain Deal or the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits have been suggested as models for how to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. But these example agreements won’t work in the Gulf. There is no country like Turkey that has the geography, politics, or capabilities to unilaterally guarantee movement through the Strait. Less recognized practices like the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand offer more realistic models for Hormuz. Less recognized practices like the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand offer more realistic models for Hormuz. MSP was launched in 2004 to enhance security in the Malacca Strait and bolster existing bilateral arrangements. Participating navies conducted coordinated sea patrols and practiced information sharing between ships and naval operation centres. As a result of its success, Lloyd’s Joint War Risk Committee dropped the classification of the Malacca Strait as a ‘war risk area’ in 2006. Under the International Maritime Organization, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia also established the Malacca Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) and STRAITREP system to enhance safety of navigation in the Malacca Strait and the region. The TSS and MSP are both viable models for future traffic monitoring and verification process in the Gulf region.
Chatham House
