Jill Lepore argues in her new Pulitzer-winning history that it desperately needs update, traces emergence of roadblocks
Harvard University
Kenya’s G7 role must address the economic pressures fuelling domestic criticism of President Ruto Expert comment LToremark 10 June 2026 Kenya has felt the pressures of costly debt, risk-averse Western investment and China’s industrial dominance. The G7 summit on global economic imbalances is a chance to speak up. Kenya’s participation at the G7 summit in France on 16-17 June sees it walk a familiar tightrope between international opportunity and domestic political risk. Though Kenya has attended three G7 summits since 2017, its presence this year has been spotlighted by South Africa’s reported exclusion following US pressure.President William Ruto will see the invite as tacit endorsement of his efforts to present Kenya as a reliable broker between global powers. The G7 summit also follows Kenya’s co-hosting of the Africa–France summit on 11–12 May in Nairobi, framed as the first edition in a non-Francophone country by design – although critics took a more sceptical view. But Ruto’s international ambitions rest on shaky domestic foundations. Related work Does President Ruto have the means to appease Kenya’s protestors? Major anti-government demonstrations in June 2024, which led Ruto to dissolve his cabinet, followed a prolonged inflation crisis and proposed new taxes – but also came just weeks after a state visit to the US which drew criticism for its cost. Recent protests – over a US-backed Ebola quarantine facility on Kenyan soil, and a transport shutdown over rising fuel prices – show how external conditions continue to affect domestic politics. A purely symbolic Kenyan presence at the G7 would do little to alleviate these pressures. The summit’s headline focus on global economic imbalances, however, is a chance for Kenya to speak out on structural conditions that have constrained its domestic choices. Global economic imbalances and Kenyan debtThe main theme of this year’s G7 refers to large and persistent disparities in the current account balances – the sum of a country’s trade in goods and services – of major economies. The world’s two largest economic powers feature on opposite sides of this equation: a US current account deficit of 0.9 per cent of global GDP last year contrasting with China’s surplus worth 0.8 per cent.This G7 focus is particularly timely for Kenya. As a lower middle-income country with a market-facing economy and persistent trade deficits, its experience shows how global imbalances can deepen existing vulnerabilities.Kenya’s defining weakness in recent years has been its public debt burden, with servicing costs consuming over a third of revenues. As the largest bilateral lender to Kenya, China has attracted much of the blame. But this is not the full story. There has also been a parallel rise in Kenyan borrowing from international commercial markets.The decade following the 2008 global financial crisis saw Kenya issue its first Eurobonds alongside a rapid surge in Chinese lending to Africa, as global interest rates remained low despite US deficits. In the post-COVID-19 era, however, the US deficit has contributed to higher global interest rates, leading to rising Kenyan borrowing costs and refinancing challenges.Billions of US dollars in Chinese lending agreed in 2014-15 for a major Kenyan railway project – converted to renminbi in 2025 – were set at floating commercial interest rates that subsequently surged after 2021. In parallel, Kenya’s struggles to secure liquidity for a $2 billion Eurobond repayment due in June 2024 brought a rapid slide in the Kenyan shilling, worsening the fiscal crisis that precipitated major youth-led protests.Kenyan leaders must shoulder the primary blame for the rapid accumulation of unproductive debt. But indirect exposure to global conditions has made the solutions more painful.Kenya’s trade imbalancesAlongside its debt stock, China is also Kenya’s largest trade partner and runs a widening trade surplus: 2024 figures show Chinese exports to Kenya were $4.3 billion, against $196 million in imports. Closing this gap will be difficult for several reasons. One is that deals presented by China as addressing the disparity may ultimately keep it intact. In May, China finalized an interim agreement extending zero-tariff access to 53 African countries. Kenyan agricultural exports are an obvious beneficiary of tariff removal – as the continent’s mineral and energy exports were already tariff-free – but Kenya’s middle-income status meant it had first negotiated a reciprocal agreement to open its market to Chinese imports. A rumoured 10-year timeline for this also compares unfavourably to existing 25-year deals with the EU and UK. Related work Kenya’s conversion of Chinese debt to renminbi reflects economic pragmatism more than strained US ties However, more consequential drivers of this trade gap are the structural conditions underpinning China’s global surplus – including weak domestic consumption, industrial subsidies and an undervalued renminbi – which erode the relative competitiveness of Kenyan industry. The US remains a more significant market for Kenyan exports, totalling $662 million in 2024, but its tariffs have introduced significant uncertainty.The example of a French road project epitomizes how such imbalances constrain Kenya’s economic decisions. In 2019, Kenya signed a $1.5 billion deal with a French consortium to build an upgraded toll highway between central Kenya and Nairobi. Kenya cancelled the contract in 2024 amid rising costs and reports that the French partners declined to take on the risk of potential shortfalls in toll revenues. The contract was instead awarded to Chinese contractors who promised to accept this risk and deliver at a lower price, with labour and materials sourced from China.This underscores the difficult decisions facing Kenya. On the one hand, Western countries claim that their financing models create fewer dependencies than China, yet a risk-averse private sector was unable or unwilling to deliver at a time of acute vulnerability for Kenya. On the other hand, Chinese firms, with the muscle of state backing, can reduce project cost and fiscal risk – but imported materials and labour add to an already glaring trade deficit.Kenya’s G7 opportunity Kenya’s G7 participation is a chance to ensure that summit debates on global imbalances do not neglect a shared responsibility to emerging economies. An attainable first step following on from the Africa–France summit is to secure expanded G7 commitment to a first-loss guarantee mechanism to help derisk investment. Another more challenging objective will be to ensure that stricter EU trade measures do not disincentivize Chinese investments in African export industries. Kenya must also leverage its Ebola quarantine commitment to extract US concessions, including progress on a trade agreement first proposed in President Trump’s first term.
Chatham House
Donald Trump weiß, wie sich mit Sport Wähler gewinnen lassen. Für seinen 80. Geburtstag am 14. Juni lässt der US-Präsident vor dem Weißen Haus eine Kampfarena errichten. Und auch die Fußball-WM dürfte er zu seiner Bühne machen.
Deutschlandfunk
10.06.26 - In collaboration with municipalities across Western Switzerland, hospitals, and partner institutes, EPFL is launching URBASAN, a project that will map how urban environments influence the way people sleep. Data shows that nearly half of Switzerland’s population reports sleep-related problems. The prevalence of these disorders has increased in recent years, and sleep quality has now become a public health problem. Poor sleep can reflect and contribute to broader health issues, including depression and neurodegenerative diseases. To address this challenge, the project URBASAN will map the sleep habits of the population. Researchers will analyze the data collected, early detect sleep troubles, and evaluate the influence of factors such as traffic noise, housing density, green spaces, and nighttime light exposure. The initiative is led by Stéphane Joost, senior scientist at the Laboratory for biological geochemistry at the ENAC School, and Philippe Voruz, psychologist at the Geneva University Hospitals (HUG) and EPFL postdoctoral researcher. “We combine data collection, analysis, and public-health interventions through a secure and independent platform,” explains Joost. The goal is to create a reproducible model that administration can use to define public policies. The project has received CHF 1.5 million in funding from Promotion Santé Suisse, a private foundation supported by the cantons, the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH), and health insurance companies, with the collaboration of the municipalities of La Chaux-de-Fonds and Le Locle in the canton of Neuchâtel, Yverdon-les-Bains in Vaud, and Onex in the canton of Geneva. Good sleep means good mental health While Switzerland is considered a country with one of the best health systems, much of the resources are focused on treatment rather than on prevention. The goal of the project URBASAN is to evaluate sleep health and take targeted preventive actions based on the findings. “This is a project about sleep quality, but what we are really evaluating is the mental health of the population,” says Phillipe Voruz. While the clinical sleep data reveals individual struggles, aggregating this information geographically allows discovering the bigger picture about how our neighborhoods and city designs influence the collective well-being. Through the accessible platform, participants will complete a set of questions that evaluate their sleep habits alongside indicators related to depression and anxiety, physical activity, and environmental conditions. “These are the same tests we use in our practice in the hospital to diagnose sleep troubles,” comments Phillipe Voruz. The methodology has been approved by the ethics committees of each of the three participating cantons. The data collected by the platform is anonymized and stored on EPFL servers, where researchers will conduct the analysis. According to Joost, hosting and analyzing the data at EPFL helps strengthen public trust in data protection and cybersecurity. © 2026 EPFL A key collaboration with municipalities and hospitals All municipalities participating in URBASAN share a commitment to developing a long-term public health culture. Local administrations such as Yverdon-les-Bains want to use field data to better tailor public-health policies to local needs. The results of the project will help administrations better understand how urban factors and socioeconomic dynamics impact the lives of their citizens and define targeted initiatives that promote public health. The project combines EPFL’s expertise in environmental geography with the clinical expertise of the hospitals that collaborate. For instance, the HUG hosts the platform in SPECCHIO-HUB, a website created by the Unit of Population Epidemiology (UEP) of the Division of Primary Care Medicine (SMPR) that hosts the different studies carried out by the UEP. These studies aim to better understand the risk and protection factors that impact the health of the population in Geneva. At the Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV) the project is led by the center for sleep research (CIRS). After analyzing the data collected by the platform, EPFL researchers will design, propose, and execute prevention and public awareness campaigns. “We will focus our interventions on neighborhoods where the data reveals signs of sleep-related problems,” explains Stéphane Joost. These interventions will be based on well-established protocols that are designed to maximize impact while remaining cost-effective and optimizing the patient’s journey. A long-term multipurpose platform Although other projects developed in Japan, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia followed a similar approach, the uniqueness of the URBSASAN platform lies in the intersection between the academic environment in spatial epidemiology and the authorities and institutions managing public health. In about one year, Joost expects to have the first significant data to launch precise actions. But the platform will remain open, and participants can fill the questionnaire again in the future so researchers can evaluate the evolution of the results over time. The platform, designed by the HEIG-VD, is designed to be flexible enough to be used by more cities and adapt to future studies that can address other health issues. The long-term ambition of URBASAN is to transform how Swiss cities design urban environments that allow better sleep and a healthier life. Hector Garcia Morales
EPFL
Die EU-Richtlinie zur Entgelttransparenz gilt bereits. Sie soll die Lohnlücke zwischen Männern und Frauen verkleinern, doch Deutschland hat sie noch nicht umgesetzt. Was Beschäftigte jetzt schon einfordern können.
Deutschlandfunk
Europe's Capital Markets Union debate is again centred on how to turn savings into productive investment. This column uses Danish ownership and register data to show that pension fund equity investment is associated with higher productivity only among unlisted firms. It argues that this is consistent with four distinct channels: capital supply, long-term commitment, engagement, and signalling. This has implications for the tension between microprudential safety and macroeconomic risk-bearing. A well-designed Capital Markets Union should support investment vehicles that allow pension funds to invest in unlisted equity while preserving diversification, transparency, and saver protection.
Center for Economic Policy Research
Can Iraq’s new prime minister finally rein in its armed factions? Expert comment thilton.drupal 9 June 2026 The Iran war has seemingly created a potential opportunity to integrate armed groups into the state. But significant hurdles remain. As the US-Israeli war with Iran drags on, Iraq’s government under new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi faces a challenge that has plagued successive governments: how to establish meaningful authority over the dozens of armed groups, loosely connected under the umbrella organization of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), that operate outside the government’s direct command. The issue has become increasingly urgent because some of these groups, backed by Iran, are drawing Iraq into the regional conflict that Baghdad has sought to avoid.The long-standing issue has gained fresh momentum in recent weeks. Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who leads the Saraya al-Salam armed group, announced his support for its integration in May. More notably, Qais al-Khazali, the head of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq armed group and a long-time Tehran ally who has recently increased his focus on domestic Iraqi politics, also signalled his group would integrate into the state. While Sadr has made similar pledges before, it is noteworthy that such rhetoric is now being echoed by a wider range of actors. However, other factions have refused. These include groups that are more deeply embedded in Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’, among them Kataeb Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, who have made it clear that they will continue to fight regardless of Baghdad’s policies. Their position exposes the limits of any integration effort: the groups with the greatest domestic political stake in Iraqi institutions are the most amenable to integration, while groups with more loyalty to Tehran’s regional project have less incentive to subordinate themselves to the government in Baghdad. Formal incorporation does not necessarily change who holds real authority. The key question is whether the Iraqi government and its allies have both the ability and the will to confront these groups. The recent killing of a government intelligence officer in a drone attack, which Iraq’s foreign minister attributed to ‘factions from the inside’, suggests that confrontation will likely be dangerous. Every new Iraqi government arrives with ambitious promises. Yet governing reform agendas tend to lose momentum once confronted by powerful political parties, entrenched patronage networks and armed actors with influence inside and outside of the government. Zaidi’s new government must now consider whether the war has provided a potential opportunity to break this cycle, or whether these fundamental obstacles remain.No longer neutralBaghdad has attempted to shield Iraq from the escalating regional conflict that followed Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack on Israel. Yet the latest phase of the US-Israeli confrontation with Iran has exposed the limits of that strategy.During previous rounds of escalation, particularly the 12-day war in June 2025, Iran largely instructed its allied Iraqi armed groups to stand down. Preserving stability in Iraq served Tehran’s interests: Iraq provided an important economic lifeline amid sanctions and offered strategic depth that Iran was reluctant to jeopardize. Related work Iraqi civilians are paying the price of the Iran war That calculation has changed. Tehran sees itself as in an existential conflict and no longer seeks to preserve the status quo in the region or in Iraq. Instead, it increasingly sees Iraq as a key arena through which it can project influence and reinforce a new regional deterrence as it seeks to raise the economic and security costs of continued conflict for its adversaries. During the war, Iran-aligned Iraqi militias have claimed attacks against US interests in Iraq and the region, while the US and Israel have carried out strikes on groups in Iraq. The presence of armed groups in Iraq has diminished Baghdad’s room for manoeuvre as the US/Israel and Iran play out their confrontation on Iraqi territory. A political opening?In recent years, many Iraqi faction leaders have experienced the benefits of the country’s relative stability. While other countries connected with Tehran’s project descended into conflict and economic crisis, Iraq has enjoyed relative calm and periods of economic growth. PMF leaders acquired parliamentary seats, ministerial portfolios and influence throughout the civil service. For many of them, participation in government became more profitable than permanent resistance. The current war therefore threatens the gains they have made from stability. As Iraq becomes a battlefield, resistance is increasingly bad for business. Together, these developments have created a potential political opening as the interests of some PMF leaders increasingly align with the government’s interest in preventing militias from dragging the country into further conflict. The push for action is not coming solely from within Iraq. The Trump administration has become increasingly impatient with Baghdad, demanding stronger action against Iran-aligned armed groups and greater government control over weapons. Tom Barrack, who was already playing an active role before being recently formally announced as special envoy to Iraq, has welcomed integration in line with the broader US goal of reducing the influence of Iran-backed armed organisations across the region. Washington has continued to impose sanctions on individuals and institutions suspected of facilitating Iranian influence. Iraqi officials worry that inaction could expose the country to greater economic and diplomatic pressure, including restrictions on access to dollar flows that are critical to Iraq’s economy. The integration illusionYet even if the political conditions for integration are becoming more favourable, implementation remains extraordinarily difficult. Iraq has seen similar processes before. For example, the Badr Corps paramilitary formally entered government institutions after 2003, but this did not sever its pre-existing political loyalties and it continued to exercise influence outside of government. This reflects a broader characteristic of the Iraqi political system. Power is frequently exercised through informal networks. Decisions are often made in party headquarters rather than government offices. Senior officials may answer as much to political or armed patrons as they do to their formal superiors. Related work Tackling Iraq’s unaccountable state The same challenge applies to militia integration. Moving fighters into state institutions does not automatically transfer their loyalty to the government. As one Iraqi fighter recently remarked to me: ‘What is integration? Moving the gun from my right hand to my left hand.’ Formal incorporation does not necessarily change who holds real authority.The crucial issue is not whether fighters keep their guns. Iraq is awash with small arms. The more important question is whether factions will surrender the drones and rockets that provide their leaders with confidence that they retain the means to defend their interests independently of the state. Without addressing those capabilities, integration risks becoming an administrative exercise rather than a genuine transfer of coercive power to Baghdad.
Chatham House
Der ChatGPT-Entwickler nimmt Kurs auf die Börse. Zugleich signalisiert die Firma, dass man sich damit Zeit nehmen wolle.
SRF Wirtschaft
