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03.09.2026
02.09.2026
Is China’s humanoid robot industry a bubble?
Wirtschaft

Is China’s humanoid robot industry a bubble?

Is China’s humanoid robot industry a bubble? Expert comment jon.wallace 2 September 2026 The market debut of Unitree, China’s leading humanoid robot company, has stoked fears that Beijing’s ambitions for robots exceed demand. Until humanoid robots reach their ‘ChatGPT moment’ those worries will remain. China’s robotics industry has been making headlines again. Videos of humanoid robots running, jumping and boxing at Beijing’s World Humanoid Games swamped social media feeds in late August – including a robot that broke Usain Bolt’s 100m record.Meanwhile financial media were gripped by wild gyrations in the stock market valuation of Unitree Robotics, China’s leading humanoid company. After soaring to a $66 billion valuation on its debut listing in Shanghai, it then plunged by around $30 billion. By 1 September, the share price had stabilized at levels roughly 45 per cent down from its post-IPO peak.Underlying these events lies a stubborn question. Does the enthusiasm surrounding China’s extraordinary emerging robot industry outstrip its financial fundamentals?The answer is complex. The industry’s future prospects are not only a matter of whether humanoid robots can earn enough to justify the market valuations of the companies making them. The technological trajectory of the industry is also crucial. One key issue is when, if ever, the industry will attain a watershed ‘ChatGPT moment’.There are also important issues relating to state support. Beijing classified robotics as a priority strategic emerging industry in its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). It has backed this intent with a venture capital fund focused on robotics, AI and innovation that is expected to raise around $138 billion. Filling out the picture, Beijing recently unveiled ambitions to lead efforts to set industry standards for humanoid robots.Indeed, China has already established a dominant lead in the global humanoid robotics industry: its makers accounted for more than 90 per cent of global shipments in the first half of this year. What Unitree’s debut means for the industryThere is little doubt that Unitree’s IPO was met with irrational exuberance. At one point, its share price rocketed so high that the company’s price-to-earnings ratio reached a giddy multiple of 1,300, compared with an average of 124 for the Shanghai STAR market. It is therefore little wonder that its share price retreated in the days after the debut. The question is: are humanoid robots capable enough to do a broad spectrum of jobs well enough to make money? And if not, how soon before they are? Of course, these events do not necessarily signify that China’s humanoid robot sector lacks technological merit and commercial prospects. When the dot com bubble burst between 2000 to 2002, trillions of US dollars were wiped off the valuations of internet companies. But it did not signify the death of the internet.What Unitree’s gyrating share price does highlight is the business model for humanoid robots. The question is: are humanoid robots capable enough to do a broad spectrum of jobs well enough to make money? And if not, how soon before they are?Making robots fit for jobsHumanoid robots still have important flaws. Battery life is often too short. Robots often struggle with navigation, avoiding obstacles and knowing when to stop: many ran into barriers at the World Humanoid Games. Manual dexterity is often clunky. And robots’ ‘eyes’ are a bottleneck in areas such as contextual comprehension, or for example guessing what is hidden behind a partial view.But while shortcomings remain, progress to address them is rapid. A recent breakthrough by AgiBot, a Chinese maker, claims a battery life of up to 10 hours on a single charge. On dexterity, industry leader Linkerbot has developed a hand that can position objects with a 0.2 millimetre margin of error and lift something weighing 30 kilogrammes. And industry leaders such as Hikvision are developing 3D machine vision that can capture an object’s depth, shape and spatial coordinates.One key goal for the industry is to reach the so-called ‘ChatGPT moment’. That is defined by those in the industry as when a humanoid robot can be placed in unfamiliar surroundings and complete 80 per cent of tasks after hearing text or voice commands. When such a moment is reached, humanoid robots will be able to complete a range of tasks without the kind of specific pre-programming currently required. That would give them the adaptability to undertake a range of tasks with similar efficiency as human workers, but at a cheaper cost – the technology’s key selling point. Wang Xingxing, CEO of Unitree, said last month that such a moment could arrive ‘in two to three years if things move fast, or five to ten years if they move slowly’. Others have more aggressive projections. Wang Xiaogang, chairman of ACE Robotics, said his company expected to reach the moment by the end of 2027. Finding jobs fit for robotsAs humanoid abilities improve, the hunt is on to find them money-making jobs. Thus far, the market is still in its infancy. But the possibilities appear considerable: at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in July, robots were filmed making coffee and pizza, doing laundry, dispensing medicines, doing production line work, cleaning toilets, giving massages and more. Related work China’s Five Year Plan commits to economic resilience – as the Iran war exposes the fragility of global supply The search for robot employment is part of a bigger push by Beijing to diffuse AI throughout its economy. The Five-Year Plan states that by 2027 AI devices, agents and applications should be used in 70 per cent of key industry sectors and by 2030 in 90 per cent. However, Unitree’s prospectus shows that the lion’s share of the company’s humanoid robot revenue comes from universities, academic bodies and research laboratories – who often are buying the robots with the assistance of state subsidies. These labs then commonly sell the data they derive from training the robots back to robot companies such as Unitree. The circular nature of this economy has raised some concern over its sustainability. Only about 9 per cent of Unitree’s revenue came from sales to industry, suggesting lacklustre commercial demand thus far.More technological dominance?The upshot of such market dynamics is that the humanoid robot industry in China looks similar to the early years of the Chinese EV industry. Considerable government funding is helping to bolster demand, buying time for companies to develop technologies.But there are many uncertainties ahead. Until robots reach their ChatGPT moment, fears of bubble dynamics will persist, creating risks for investors and for scores of Chinese robot start-ups daring to dream big. Beijing hopes to reach that moment swiftly and create another industry like EVs, in which Chinese manufacturers lead the world, and China has an opportunity to set global industry standards for a potentially revolutionary future technology. In that case the Chinese robotics industry could follow the course of the EV industry. That would see it max out domestic demand, before seeking to establish export success through a similar mix of high quality and unbeatable cost. But the EV industry’s export success may itself hinder a similar effort in robotics. Chinese EVs have become a source of significant security, economic and resilience concerns in markets like Europe, as they threaten to overwhelm European manufacturers and create dependencies on Chinese supply.As a result, these markets could be quicker to raise barriers to Chinese robot imports. The US already banned new foreign-made humanoid robot imports in July. And Washington may pressure other countries to follow suit. On the other hand, it’s not clear what the alternative to a future robot industry dominated by Chinese models will be – when other countries’ robot industries lag so far behind. The sooner the ChatGPT moment arrives for China’s robots, the sooner European policymakers will be confronted by another set of familiar issues: how far should they go to defend their domestic industries? And how deeply should they integrate their technology with China’s?

Chatham House

European banks and private markets: Mapping the linkages
Wirtschaft

European banks and private markets: Mapping the linkages

The role of non-bank financial intermediaries in the financial system has increased markedly over recent decades. This column documents how the growth of private markets, one of the fastest growing segments of the sector, has created multiple channels of interconnection between banks, firms, institutional investors, private equity, and private credit funds. Banks’ exposures extend from lending to common borrowers, to direct lending to funds, financing vehicles and linkages with asset managers. While available measures suggest that euro area banks’ exposures remain limited, data gaps and hidden leverage make it difficult for intermediaries and supervisors to assess risks across the full intermediation chain.

Center for Economic Policy Research

01.09.2026
31.08.2026
The ‘reverse Kindleberger Trap’: reasons to worry about the next financial crisis
Wirtschaft

The ‘reverse Kindleberger Trap’: reasons to worry about the next financial crisis

The ‘reverse Kindleberger Trap’: reasons to worry about the next financial crisis Expert comment sfarrell.drupa… 31 August 2026 A US crisis is very likely to be associated with a capital outflow, rather than a capital inflow, with the result that the dollar could weaken substantially against other currencies. A worrying feature of the next big financial crisis is that we may lack a dominant power able and willing to stabilise the international economic order.That would certainly have been the view of the late economic historian Charles Kindleberger, who argued that the length and depth of the 1930s Depression was due to the failure of either Great Britain or the US to act as a responsible hegemon in the global economy.Kindleberger’s view was that an impoverished Great Britain, the declining hegemon, was unable to provide leadership; and that an isolationist US, the rising hegemon, was unwilling. Hence, the eponymous trap.And so, the world lacked an open trading system, any credible coordination of economic policies, or a reliable international lender of last resort. Risk stems not so much from the unwillingness of the rising hegemon in Beijing to help stabilise the system; but rather from the unwillingness of the incumbent hegemon in Washington ‘When every country turned to protect its national private interest, the world public interest went down the drain, and with it the private interests of all’.These days, though, the new Kindleberger Trap is a bit different to the original.Now, risk stems not so much from the unwillingness of the rising hegemon in Beijing to help stabilise the system; but rather from the unwillingness of the incumbent hegemon in Washington. A ‘reverse Kindleberger Trap’, if you like.The 2008 crisisThat will be new, since unwillingness certainly didn’t feature in the way the US managed the fallout of the Lehman crisis in 2008.Back then, huge amounts of dollar liquidity were provided through a network of collateralised lending facilities to global banks, especially in Europe, which had built up very large reliance on dollar funding.In addition, the Fed’s QE programme itself provided huge direct support to the international financial system: more than half the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities were sold to it by foreign firms.And fourteen central banks had access to substantial amounts of dollar liquidity from the Fed’s currency swap lines. By the summer of 2010, the Fed had supplied $10 trillion at various maturities.Of course, the US acted in its own self-interest. If the Fed hadn’t provided this liquidity, European banks and global asset managers would have been forced to sell off their dollar portfolios at fire-sale prices. But the effectiveness of US crisis management was firmly on display.And US credibility was rewarded by a substantial inflow into the US bond market as a ‘safe haven’: foreigners bought nearly a trillion dollars of US Treasury securities in the 12 months after the Lehman crisis.A Trump-era crisisA Trump-era financial crisis, should it happen, will take place under very different circumstances. Three problems stand out. The market’s growing ability to question the safe-haven status of US treasury bonds. The first is that a Trump administration noted for its transactional behaviour could end up being highly selective about who it offers liquidity to.We’ve already seen this selectivity in action. In October last year the US administration supplied a $20 billion swap facility to the Argentine central bank, in an effort to stabilise the peso in the run up to mid-term elections that might have posed a risk to President Milei’s authority.Earlier this year there was discussion about a proposed swap line for the central bank of the United Arab Emirates, a bizarre possibility, less for the fact that the UAE is a key US ally, but more for the fact that it is a country rather flush with dollar liquidity, notwithstanding the war with Iran.The second is the market’s growing ability to question the safe-haven status of US treasury bonds.In the past few weeks Scott Bessent, the US Treasury Secretary, has twice revealed his unwillingness to let the market decide what the price of US debt should be. The first was his effort to support the Japanese yen in a way that was clearly aimed at discouraging Japan from selling any of the $1 trillion of US Treasury bonds that it owns, in effect directing Japan instead to use its bonds as collateral to borrow the money it needed to fund its intervention in the foreign exchange market.And Bessent’s more recent announcement to increase Treasury buybacks of its own debt were also motivated by fear that, left to its own devices, the market might charge Washington rates of interest on US public debt that could embarrass the administration. Interventions like these are not at all consistent with the full price discovery that should be the hallmark of a credible US Treasury market.Elevated dollarA third, related, problem has to do with the elevated level of the dollar.The last 15 years have seen huge capital inflows into the US, for reasons both good (global technology leadership) and bad (absurdly high budget deficits).During that period, the stock of foreign-owned US securities has risen from around $12 trillion to over $37 trillion.As a result of all these capital inflows the dollar is, in inflation-adjusted, trade-weighted terms, nearly as expensive as it has been at any time in the last 30 years. Related work Saving global economic governance from the ‘Trump shock’ What all this means is that a US crisis is very likely to be associated with a capital outflow, rather than a capital inflow, with the result that the dollar could weaken substantially against other currencies.  That will be quite unlike the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, when the dollar strengthened.That might suit President Trump, who has often expressed a preference for a weaker rather than a stronger exchange rate. As he put it in July 2025, a strong dollar means ‘you can’t sell tractors, you can’t sell trucks, you can’t sell anything.’A crisis environment might well reinforce that view. Just as Great Britain created the Exchange Equalisation Account in 1932 to keep sterling cheap after it left the gold standard the previous September, it is conceivable that the Trump administration might be more concerned to keep the dollar weak rather than promote its role as a global anchor of stability.China risingAnd what about the rising hegemon, China?Beijing’s latest proposals for global governance, published in June, do indicate a growing willingness to shape international order.China may be willing but remains unable to act as a financial stabiliser: the renminbi remains a relatively insignificant currency in the international monetary system.All in all, then, the risk that the world faces in the next financial crisis is a ‘reverse Kindleberger Trap’, where the dominant power is the one that’s unwilling to play a responsible crisis-management role; and where the rising power is the one that is unable.No one should wish to hasten the next financial crisis, given the economic dislocation and immiseration that will inevitably be associated with it. But the prospect of a ‘reverse Kindleberger Trap’ should make us all fear that crisis even more.

Chatham House

30.08.2026