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26.11.2025
25.11.2025
24.11.2025
Press release - MEPs push for “military Schengen” to withstand potential Russian aggression
Politik

Press release - MEPs push for “military Schengen” to withstand potential Russian aggression

Transport and Defence MEPs call urgently for easier movement of troops and military equipment across the EU by removing internal borders and upgrading infrastructure.Committee on Security and DefenceCommittee on Transport and Tourism Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Europäisches Parlament

The industrial age returns: Is Europe ready?
Wirtschaft

The industrial age returns: Is Europe ready?

The industrial age returns: Is Europe ready? Expert comment LToremark 24 November 2025 Europe can achieve more than pessimists assume. But it requires alignment and political decisiveness. The 19th century German economist and political theorist Friedrich List once argued that ‘the power of a nation is based upon the development of its productive forces’.  As Europe finds itself grappling with an identity crisis amid the most consequential geopolitical shifts since the end of Second World War, it is coming to terms with the hard truth that in great power competition, industrial might drives all other forms of power. Europe is belatedly confronting how much of its influence rested on economic gravity it can no longer take for granted – nor sustain any longer.  For the past two decades, the EU mistook regulatory leadership for strategic insulation.  To assert its geopolitical relevance, defend its sovereignty and build a third way between the United States and China, Europe – more precisely the European Union (EU) – will need to radically transform its economy to become a credible competitor in the new industrial age. There will be no European power without a home-grown cutting-edge industry fit for a century driven by the twin transitions of digitization and carbon neutrality.These transitions are reshaping global power across the world. Platform economics, AI computing, critical minerals, resilient grids and low-carbon industrial ecosystems now set the norms of strategic weight. Meanwhile, Europe’s exposure to coercive dependencies — from gas pipelines to semiconductor supply chains — has revealed how fragile a post-industrial comfort zone can become in a world reverting to hard power. Related work Mario Draghi’s competitiveness report sets a political test for the EU For the past two decades, the EU mistook regulatory leadership for strategic insulation. But without productive depth in energy, technology, advanced manufacturing and scale finance, even the most sophisticated rulebook cannot anchor geopolitical relevance. Europe is now waking up to industrial reality and has begun to rethink its strategy. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently warned that Europe needs a new mindset, and move its focus from regulation to capability-building. But is it too late to catch up to those leading the charge?Europe’s strategic opportunitiesEurope can achieve more than pessimists assume — if leaders act with coherenceand speed.  Europe has the raw material for influence. What it lacks is alignment and, above all, political decisiveness. The recent launch of EuroStack is a step in the right direction. The initiative aims to build a secure, sovereign cloud and AI computing infrastructure for Europe, to reduce dependence on non-European platforms. The bloc also retains strengths in industrial automation, clean-tech engineering, automotive electrification, robotics and advanced materials. The European Chips Act, though modest compared to US and Asian programmes, can consolidate Europe’s niche strengths in power electronics and industrial semiconductors — critical for electric vehicles (EVs), renewables and next-generation manufacturing. In energy, offshore wind, green hydrogen, grid modernization and solar manufacturing can anchor a cheaper, cleaner and more secure ecosystem — if permitting accelerates and scale is pursued collectively.Three axes of political integration will be crucial to sustain the momentum and achieve substantial gains. First is capital formation, via an integrated capital markets union (CMU). Second is industrial deployment, through mission-driven innovation agencies (a European DARPA). Third is joint procurement and shared infrastructure, especially for hydrogen, semiconductors and AI computing.Europe has the raw material for influence. What it lacks is alignment and, above all, political decisiveness.Structural obstacles  Related work The rise of Reform, the AfD and RN is more than a blip – so what happens if the E3 goes far right? Some obvious and deeply rooted structural obstacles remain. And at a time when the continent’s shift to the hard right is accelerating, any attempt to lift them will be akin to walking through a minefield. Financial fragmentation means European savings do not translate into European investment in support of European tech scale-up. Without a functioning capital markets union, the continent cannot finance gigafactories, semiconductor fabs, hydrogen valleys or cloud-AI clusters. As the 2024 Draghi Report notes, Europe invests less not because it lacks capital, but because it cannot mobilize it — and when it can, it remains much less profitable than in the US.Regulatory divergence weakens scale. Telecoms, data, energy and transport remain balkanized — a continental handicap in sectors defined by network effects. And then German hesitation comes into play. Berlin’s instinctive caution — fiscal orthodoxy, coalition constraints, reluctance to embrace strategic debt — acts as a major brake on Europe’s structural reform trajectory, one that could recast the single market as a pivotal source of financing for the EU’s industrial transformation. Slow progress on grids, hydrogen corridors and industrial incentives reflects a deeper unwillingness to transition from an export-driven model to a resilience-driven one. But Germany’s reluctance is not just political, it is also structural. Its banking system is designed to protect regional lending rather than finance innovation at scale. It has long been identified as a major barrier to deeper capital-markets integration and high-growth investment in Europe, limiting cross-border financial intermediation and risk-sharing across the Eurozone.Overstated risks, overlooked strengths Related work Greece’s LNG energy hub ambitions will help EU needs now – but should not shape long-term policy It would be a mistake, however, to only focus on Europe’s structural slowness. Some of its perceived weaknesses are less structural than the prevailing narrative suggests. On AI: The EU’s absence of consumer platforms obscures its real strengths: industrial AI, robotics, embedded systems, autonomy and safety engineering — domains where value will accumulate as AI becomes infrastructure. Its industrial software ecosystem (SAP, Siemens, Dassault Systèmes) remains a global asset.On batteries: The tired cliché is that ‘Europe lost the battery race’ but gigafactories are scaling across the continent, in Sweden, France, Hungary and Spain. Europe is also emerging as a frontrunner in solid-state, sodium-ion and LFP technologies.

Chatham House

21.11.2025
20.11.2025
Low-cost Chinese AI models forge ahead, even in the US, raising the risks of a US AI bubble
Gesellschaft

Low-cost Chinese AI models forge ahead, even in the US, raising the risks of a US AI bubble

Low-cost Chinese AI models forge ahead, even in the US, raising the risks of a US AI bubble Expert comment jon.wallace 20 November 2025 Nvidia’s latest earnings report reassured some. But Chinese AI models are fast gaining a following around the world, underlining concerns over an ‘AI bubble’ centered on high-investment, high-cost US models. This week Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia, took issue with talk of an ‘AI bubble’, as Nvidia announced bumper earnings growth in the latest quarter on strong sales of AI chips. ‘There has been a lot of talk about an AI bubble. From our vantage point we see something very different,’ he told analysts on Wednesday.Yet Huang’s previous remark on 6 November, that China will ‘win’ in AI , should be taken seriously in the West – in part for what it says about bubble fears. Huang is not the only prominent US figure to have commented recently on China’s remarkable progress in artificial intelligence.Brian Chesky, CEO of Airbnb and a friend of OpenAI founder Sam Altman, said that his company ‘relies heavily’ on Alibaba’s Qwen because the Chinese model is ‘very good’ and ‘also fast and cheap’. In contrast, he said of OpenAI’s ChatGPT: ‘I don’t think it was quite ready’ for Airbnb’s needs.Remarkably, Martin Casado, a partner at US venture capital firm 16z, says that most of the AI entrepreneurs he sees in the US are using AI models made in China. ‘I’d say 80 per cent chance [they are] using a Chinese open-source model,’ he was quoted as saying. Chamath Palihapitiya of Social Capital, a US investment firm, said he has chosen Kimi K2, an open-source AI model developed by the Chinese company Moonshot AI, to perform much of his company’s work. This is because Kimi K2 ‘was really way more performant and frankly just a ton cheaper than OpenAI and Anthropic’, he said.The AI race between the US and China is still in its early stages. It is too early to call a definitive winner. But the assessments of key industry figures that low-cost, high performance Chinese AI models are gaining ground in the US should add to concerns over an AI bubble’ – one centred around high-cost US models. China has huge cost advantages It is clear that Chinese AI companies enjoy key structural advantages over US counterparts. The main one is cost. This includes both the cost of developing new AI models and updates, as well as the cost of operating Large Language Models (LLM) for customers.In terms of development costs, China is quite simply in a different universe. By some estimates, Moonshot AI’s Kimi K2 cost just $4.6 million to train, a fraction of the billions that OpenAI is spending on research and development.  Related work The world should take the prospect of Chinese tech dominance seriously, and start preparing now Similarly, the costs of running the leading Chinese LLMs – DeepSeek, Qwen-Plus and Kimi K2 Thinking – come in at a sharp discount to operating both GPT 5 from OpenAI and Claude Sonnet 4.5 from Anthropic. For reference, the Claude Sonnet 4.5 costs $15 per million output tokens, while the Kimi K2 Thinking costs $2.5 .Another aspect of the leading Chinese LLMs’ appeal is that they are open-source. This allows users to deploy models on their own private infrastructure and ensure that sensitive data remains in-house. Several US LLMs are closed source, including ChatGPT. However, Llama from Meta, Phi from Microsoft and Gemma from Google are open-source. Indeed, even OpenAi launched the open-source GPT-oss in August.The US has access to much more powerful chipsThe US AI companies, however, enjoy an advantage in their unrestricted access to the latest AI chips, the Blackwell series made by Nvidia. The US has banned these chips from being sold to China, with US president Donald Trump saying this month that only US customers should have access. US export controls are far from watertight. Some banned chips are smuggled into China. Others are obtained by Chinese companies in third countries.  As things stand, the most advanced Nvidia chip that China can access under Washington’s export control regime is the H20, a high performing semiconductor which is nevertheless a full generation behind the latest Blackwell B200 and B100 chips. This gulf is thought to give users of the latest Blackwell chips up to 15 times more compute power over those using the H20.

Chatham House