Re-interpreting Freedom

Freedom is considered one of the defining achievements of modernity, yet also one of its greatest challenges. This special issue of HSG FOCUS therefore addresses a highly relevant social issue: how can freedom be reinterpreted in the 21st century? This issue is based on the work of the inaugural cohort of the St.Gallen Collegium, which brought together researchers and thinkers from a variety of disciplines.
The starting point is the observation that freedom is under pressure worldwide. Political polarisation, geopolitical conflicts, economic uncertainty, and technological upheavals pose fundamental challenges to liberal democracies. Against this backdrop, the Collegium’s fellows examined how individual autonomy, political participation and social responsibility can be preserved and developed in changing circumstances.
At the heart of this issue lies the belief that freedom cannot be safeguarded by simple solutions or ideological certainties. In their lead article, Wolfram Eilenberger and Christoph Frei demonstrate how productive dialogue between different academic, cultural, and political perspectives can open up new spaces for thought and action. In their vision for the future of the island nation, 'Toiva 2050', the authors present a thought experiment in which they explore alternative forms of coexistence and freedom.
Several articles draw on historical examples to improve our understanding of current developments. Wolfram Eilenberger interprets Venice as the source of an untapped liberal European tradition. In turn, Andreas Lingg uses the decline of the Venetian Republic to illustrate how the withdrawal of elites from public responsibility can weaken innovative capacity, political agency, and societal prospects for the future.
Other authors focus on the economic prerequisites of freedom. Annette Kehnel interprets the myth of King Midas as a warning against a culture of boundless profit-seeking, questioning the idea that material prosperity automatically leads to greater freedom. Tanja A. Gonzalez examines the role of capital markets, arguing that economic freedom is only effective when there is genuine participation in economic decision-making processes.
Finally, Árpád Szakolczai critically examines the current state of liberal democracies. He challenges the fundamental principles of neoliberalism, analysing how media concentration, political power and economic interests influence the freedom of public discourse.
The articles in this issue of HSG FOCUS make one thing clear: freedom is neither static nor guaranteed. It requires responsibility, participation, and a willingness to actively shape social developments. In times of profound upheaval, the St.Gallen Collegium provides valuable insights into the future of democracy, the economy, and society.

YouTube Video

Palantir and Switzerland – Between data and power (2026, SRF)

A well-researched documentary from SRF on Palantir’s efforts to supply the Swiss government with AI tools (I was interviewed for this documentary).

Book

Thomas Mann: Death in Venice (1913)

The grandmother of all novellas – on the joy of living and the lack thereof on the most beautiful beach in the world.

Book

E.F. Schumacher: Small is Beautiful. Economics as if People Mattered (1973)

Schumacher was chief economist and advisor to the British National Coal Board, the country’s largest energy company; he travelled to Burma in 1955 as an economic advisor, and there he began to ask: Is the richest society the one that produces the most – or the one that needs the least to live well? His proposal: Buddhist economics instead of the Midas Touch. Essential reading.

Book

August Cole / P. W. Singer: Burn-In (2020)

August Cole and P. W. Singer’s book "Burn-In" is a fast-paced thriller grounded in deeply researched fiction about security, conflict, and AI.

Book

Simone Weil: Venice Saved (1940)

The only play by the philosopher Simone Weil. On the saving power of beauty in dark times.

Film

Andrei Tarkovsky: Stalker (1979)

Based on the novel "Roadside Picnic" by Arkady and Boris Strugatsky. The Zone that arose on Earth for unknown reasons attracts attention with inexplicable phenomena that occur there. A rumor has spread that in the center of the Zone there is something that gives a person everything he wants. But staying in the Zone is deadly, and therefore it is strictly guarded. There, each for their own reasons, the Writer and the Professor go, the Stalker leads them to the mysterious center, feeling and understanding the Zone.

Book

Georg Luck (ed.): The Wisdom of the Dogs. Texts of the Ancient Cynics in German Translation (1997

The Cynics were the representatives of ancient punk philosophy – they lived on the streets, owned nothing, and held up a mirror to the Midases of their time. Diogenes, who lived in a barrel and asked Alexander the Great to please step out of the sun. Here you’ll find the original quotes. Sharp, witty, highly topical.

Book

Cristina Baldacci et al.: Venice and the Anthropocene: An Ecocritical Guide (2022)

Full of interesting insights into the lagoon city as an exemplary model of ecological and economic sustainability – and, yes, also of non-sustainability.

Book

Kazuo Ishiguro: Klara and the Sun (2021)

For a contemplative work about the future of AI, autonomous robotics, and human nature read Nobel Laureate, Kazuo Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun.

Podcast

CII's Podcast: The Voice of Corporate Governance (since 2026)

An accessible way to hear corporate governance debates through expert conversations that connect technical rules to their real-world consequences.

Series

Katja Meier: $HARE (2025)

Lena Corbyn inherits a mining empire – and decides to blow it up from the inside. What happens when someone deliberately rejects the Midas touch? The Swiss series explores such a scenario. Thrilling. Award-winning, recommended by Forbes and The Guardian, executive produced by Rhea Seehorn (Better Call Saul). A must-watch.

Book

Alex Edmans: Grow the Pie (2020)

A timely exploration of corporate responsibility. Engagingly written with many real-life examples.

Book

Aldous Huxley: Ape and Essence (1948)

Huxley's dystopian classic is a nightmare vision of the fate of humanity in a post-nuclear world.

Book

Vaughan Hart / Peter Hicks: Sansovino's Venice (2017)

There are many publications on the crisis in Venice in the 16th century. Rather than providing bibliographical recommendations, here is a travel suggestion. The city's former commercial splendour and strength are still tangible today. The same applies to its leading role in long-distance trade and the arts and crafts. You can visit the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, where goods from St Gallen were sold in those days; Murano, whose glassware was shipped as far as the New World; and the Arsenale, one of Europe’s first proto-industrial complexes. To accompany your travels, I recommend Francesco Sansovino’s city guide, first published in 1581 and now available in a new English edition by Vaughan Hart and Peter Hicks. Sansovino wrote this book with the intention of conjuring up an image of unity in the face of the ever-widening rifts in the Republic’s political and cultural fabric. For those wishing to trace the fault lines addressed in the book, an excursion to the mainland to visit a villa—the newly built country estates of Venetian patricians at the time—is highly recommended. A prime example is the Villa Barbaro in Maser, designed and built by the renowned architect Andrea Palladio. It epitomises the inner turmoil of the upper classes at that time. The villa's patrons, the brothers Marc’Antonio and Daniele Barbaro, spent their entire lives exploring the tension between the countryside and the lagoon, private idyll and public affairs, and detachment and engagement through letters and books.

Stay focused

From the feeds of universities, think tanks, and the media.
06.08.2026
05.08.2026
Kampf um Demokratie - Wenn Mächtige die Welt neu ordnen
Politics

Kampf um Demokratie - Wenn Mächtige die Welt neu ordnen

Freiheit und Demokratie sind weltweit unter Druck. In Europa ist Krieg, Nationalismus erstarkt und der Einfluss von Tech-Oligarchen wächst. Ist die Stärke des Rechts dem Recht des Stärkeren noch gewachsen? Wie steht es um die Freiheit? (Erstsendung 21.1.2026)Wentzien, Birgit

Deutschlandfunk

Saudi Arabia still views the US as its main strategic partner – despite Trump’s nuclear agreement conditions
Politics

Saudi Arabia still views the US as its main strategic partner – despite Trump’s nuclear agreement conditions

Saudi Arabia still views the US as its main strategic partner – despite Trump’s nuclear agreement conditions Expert comment jon.wallace 5 August 2026 Riyadh’s argument to Washington is that a close partnership should not be contingent on membership of the Abraham Accords, when it is playing a growing role in regional security. A series of seemingly disconnected developments over the past week point to a common objective in Saudi foreign policy. Riyadh is seeking to assume greater responsibility for regional security. But it also wants to reinforce its importance to the US, at a time when Washington’s long-term commitment to the Middle East is increasingly in doubt. The recent civilian nuclear agreement with the US underlines the depth of its commitment to that partnership. For much of the past decade, successive US administrations have sought to reduce their exposure to Middle Eastern conflicts while encouraging regional partners like Saudi Arabia to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Ironically, it is President Donald Trump’s war against Iran – involving the largest deployment of US forces since 1990 – that has prompted Riyadh to reassess its role in the regional order. Saudi Arabia increasingly views itself as a provider of security, stability and economic continuity. This is not simply a response to President Trump’s calls for burden-sharing. Saudi Arabia’s leadership has concluded that the regional environment demands it take a more active role. The challenge for Riyadh is no longer how to secure US protection. It is how to safeguard Saudi interests in a region where US engagement remains substantial, but is less predictable than in the past. Recent conflicts have also reinforced the risks posed by increasingly volatile regional dynamics, including the potential for actions by Israel or Iran to trigger wider instability that directly affects Saudi interests.The nuclear dealThat calculation helps to explain the civilian nuclear agreement signed by Saudi Arabia and the US on 22 July. The agreement represents the culmination of years of patient negotiation by Riyadh, as it persisted in seeking a deal with Washington – rather than Moscow or Beijing. The Kingdom has always believed that US technology, expertise and investment would provide the strongest foundation for its ambitions. The agreement deepens the relationship by establishing a framework for long-term cooperation on civilian nuclear technology, and positioning US companies to play a leading role in the Saudi nuclear programme. It also demonstrates that Saudi Arabia continues to regard the US as its principal strategic partner. Behind the scenes, Riyadh wants to make sure that the question of normalization with Israel does not come to overshadow the broader foundations of its partnership with Washington.  However, one day after it was signed, President Trump sought to link the agreement’s approval to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords – that is, normalizing its relations with Israel. But Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained that formal relations with Israel depend on meaningful progress towards Palestinian statehood. And that position has only hardened following the brutal war in Gaza and the anger it has generated across the Arab world. Riyadh has made clear that it will not abandon that position.The issue remains unresolved, at least in public. But behind the scenes, Riyadh wants to make sure that the question of normalization with Israel does not come to overshadow the broader foundations of its partnership with Washington. Saudi crown prince and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is, in effect, making the case that the kingdom’s contribution to regional stability, economic security and collective security efforts warrants progress in other areas of the bilateral relationship without the need for further conditions – particularly politically impossible ones like joining the Abraham Accords.Regional securitySaudi Arabia’s more active role in regional security is already evident in the Red Sea – which has become one of the world’s most important and vulnerable waterways. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has increased the Red Sea’s importance as an alternative route for energy exports and international trade. But in recent days the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen has sought to drag these waters into the wider regional conflict.On 20 July, the Houthis announced a blockade of Saudi-linked shipping passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Within days, the group claimed attacks against Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea. On 25 July, it launched missile and drone strikes against Aramco facilities in Jizan and Yanbu, Saudi Arabia’s principal Red Sea oil export hub. These moves have exposed a significant vulnerability for the kingdom and the wider global economy, increasing costs for commercial shipping and raising concerns about the resilience of international supply chains and energy markets. Related work How the Iran war is reshaping Saudi strategy: From Hormuz and Houthis to the UAE’s OPEC exit The Saudi government has stepped up. On 30 July, its Ministry of Defence convened military chiefs and representatives from 43 countries and the European Union in Riyadh to discuss the establishment of a new maritime security coalition to defend freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. The kingdom proposed to host the coalition’s headquarters and secured the support of 14 participating states. This is perhaps the clearest indication yet that the kingdom is prepared to coordinate collective responses to challenges that affect both its own interests and those of the wider international community. While the initiative was prompted by recent Houthi actions, it also reflects a broader Saudi recognition: the security of the Red Sea is vital to the kingdom’s economic ambitions and long-term security interests.The joint Saudi-US airstrikes of 28 July point to the same move towards a more assertive security role. Precision strikes were carried out against Iran-aligned groups in eastern Iraq, after they directed more than 30 drone attacks at Saudi energy infrastructure and US forces over a period of 72 hours. The operation was notable not only because it was conducted jointly with Washington. It was also striking because Saudi Arabia has generally sought to avoid direct military action inside Iraq. Indeed, Riyadh has spent the past several years reducing tensions with Tehran and has little interest in a broader confrontation with Iran. By acting alongside the US, Riyadh signalled that its pursuit of regional de-escalation does not preclude a willingness to respond when its security interests are directly challenged.There is also, notably, a competitive dimension to Saudi Arabia’s recent activism. Riyadh is aware of the Trump administration’s close relationship with the UAE, which has already normalized relations with Israel via the Abraham Accords, aligning closely with a key US policy objective.By taking a leading role on issues that directly affect US interests, including regional security, maritime security and energy flows, Riyadh is demonstrating that its value to Washington rests on a far broader foundation than trade and investment alone.Recent developments suggest that Saudi Arabia is seeking to redefine its role within the regional order. The kingdom will not abandon its position on Palestinian statehood. Nor will it distance itself from Washington. Instead, it is demonstrating that has crucial value to the US beyond the question of normalization with Israel. Through security cooperation, burden-sharing and a greater willingness to address regional challenges, Riyadh is making the case for a partnership defined by shared interests rather than a single political objective. 

Chatham House

Absorbing Shocks Since 1891
Business

Absorbing Shocks Since 1891

Recorded at the PSE-CEPR Policy Forum 2026. A country wants a stable exchange rate, it wants money to move freely across its borders, and it wants to set its own interest rates. It's a well-known trilemma. Central bankers must pick any two, because you cannot have all three. History, it turns out, did not read that memo. Eric Monnet has spent years reading the balance sheets that central bankers kept on each other. From 1891 onwards, the Bank of France paid teams of multilingual economists to copy out the weekly and monthly accounts of every other central bank in the world. Those ledgers, now digitised, show that central banks have been far more than interest-rate setters: for more than a century they have quietly expanded their balance sheets to cushion their economies against shocks arriving from abroad. In this week's VoxTalk, Monnet argues we have seriously underestimated how much room to manoeuvre they have used since the 19th century.

Center for Economic Policy Research

When political pressure trumps academic freedom
Business

When political pressure trumps academic freedom

Academic freedom has been declining over the past decade across the world. This column analyses over 25,000 economics working papers to show that, beyond direct intervention by authorities, political pressure also breeds self-censorship. After US federal agencies began screening research for a list of flagged words in early 2025, economists at universities most dependent on federal funding reduced politically sensitive content – even in research without any direct federal funding.

Center for Economic Policy Research

03.08.2026
By agreeing to disarm, Hamas is trying to call Israel’s bluff in Gaza
Politics

By agreeing to disarm, Hamas is trying to call Israel’s bluff in Gaza

By agreeing to disarm, Hamas is trying to call Israel’s bluff in Gaza Expert comment thilton.drupal 3 August 2026 The move may lead to more pressure on Israel to implement Trump’s 20-point plan, but both sides are likely to keep dragging out the process while avoiding any real commitments. Since the Gaza ceasefire came into effect in October 2025, the Board of Peace has focused predominantly on Hamas’s disarmament as the key to unlocking other elements of US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan. These include the entry into Gaza of the technocratic National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), and the start of desperately needed reconstruction.Most crucially, the emphasis on disarmament has precluded any discussion of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza. Instead, Israeli control of the territory has increased significantly since the start of the ceasefire, from about 53 per cent of Gaza in October (delineated by the so-called ‘Yellow Line’) to nearly 70 per cent today.President Trump’s recent announcement that Hamas has agreed to his disarmament plan may change that dynamic. By essentially calling Israel’s bluff, Hamas’s move could potentially put external pressure on Israel in Gaza for the first time in months. The question is whether the Board of Peace in general, and Trump in particular, are willing to put the necessary pressure on both parties to move past the current stalemate.Swift change unlikelyIn reality, it is unlikely that a timeline for decommissioning weapons or drawing down troops will be agreed anytime soon.Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will likely seek to drag out any further negotiations as much as possible; the last thing he wants as he goes into October’s elections is US pressure to withdraw from Gaza. Any public suggestion from Netanyahu that Israel would reduce its control in Gaza or make concessions to Hamas would likely lose him his voter base. (Far from accepting Israel’s withdrawal from the enclave, right-wing Israeli ministers have already announced plans for new settlements in Gaza.)Dragging out the process also suits Hamas. Agreeing to Trump’s plan is likely a pragmatic move by new Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya. It keeps the group in the conversation about Gaza’s future and may improve its position in relation to the Board of Peace – potentially even shifting the onus of intransigence to Israel. But Hamas knows that the actual decommissioning of its weapons will not be immediate. It is unlikely that a timeline for decommissioning weapons or drawing down troops will be agreed anytime soon. Indeed, both actors will likely double down on sequencing demands that have stymied previous attempts to reach agreements in Gaza: Israel will likely require full Hamas disarmament before withdrawal, while Hamas will likely insist on Israeli withdrawal before decommissioning weapons.Already, Israeli officials have said they will not pull back without ‘genuine disarmament’ by Hamas and have expressed ‘serious security concerns’ about the deal to the White House.Israel reportedly insisted to the Board of Peace that it reserved the right to strike areas set to be handed over to the ISF and objected to Qatar and Turkey (both central mediators in the agreement with Hamas) being involved in the roadmap’s future verification stages. It also reportedly demanded that Hamas’s weapons be destroyed rather than stored after confiscation.Hamas is also hedging. It has stated that its moves will be contingent on Israel ending ‘all forms of aggression’, as well as withdrawing to the October ceasefire’s ‘Yellow Line,’ facilitating the entry of the ISF and NCAG, and meeting humanitarian aid obligations.Hamas has also rejected Israeli demands that weapons be destroyed, and has intentionally avoided the language of disarmament or surrender. Indeed, the term ‘disarmament’ does not appear anywhere in Trump’s roadmap, relying instead on ‘decommissioning,’ modelled in part on Northern Ireland’s process. — Two perspectives on the two-state solution from the Chatham House archive: the UK’s former Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper on 9 July 2026; and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 3 November 2017. Furthermore, Hamas will likely resist full decommissioning without a broader negotiated process to realize a Palestinian state. The disarmament plan does not mention Palestinian self-determination directly, but it does refer (in Article 8) to the completion of the ‘remaining commitments under [the] Sharm [el] Sheikh Protocol,’ Trump’s initial 20-point plan for Gaza. Point 19 of that plan refers to a ‘credible pathway for Palestinian self-determination and statehood.’ Netanyahu has fully rejected the notion of Palestinian statehood, while Hamas will insist upon it.US and Board of Peace officials have stressed the ‘zero trust’ nature of the roadmap, emphasizing that it will proceed based solely on externally verified steps and conditions. But even reciprocal processes require one side to take the first step. It is more likely that both sides will buy time by telling the Board of Peace at least some semblance of what it wants to hear. Meanwhile, they will both likely avoid any real commitments by objecting to any one of the myriad thorny details required to actually implement a plan.External pressureIn this context, external commitment and pressure are crucial. For Hamas, the mediating efforts of Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar have been essential in getting the group to publicly accept the agreement. But these regional states will have less leverage in getting Hamas to implement it, as they are not physically on the ground in Gaza to enforce commitments or to provide security guarantees.On the Israeli side, it remains unclear the extent to which the US – and by extension, the Board of Peace – will be willing to impose substantive pressure on Israel to even discuss withdrawal.There are several factors to consider here. First is the question of Trump’s personal commitment to shepherding the agreement beyond the fanfare of the initial headlines. If the past year is any guide, the disarmament roadmap could easily become yet another casualty of Trump’s slapdash approach to diplomacy, in which a numbered plan is released with bravado, but then flounders without the long, arduous subsequent work required to make it operational. 

Chatham House

02.08.2026
01.08.2026